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I. INTRODUCTION
It is an amazing, yet disconcerting, moment in human history. Today,
while the West composes epitaphs to Soviet communism and exults in the
demise of the Soviet threat, we overlook a comparable, possibly more ominous
threat to security: the endangered state of our planetary system.'
For the first time in history, human action is dramatically altering the
physiology of the entire planet.2 The crisis confronting humankind today
concerns massive and widespread global assaults on our planetary system rather
than just containable pockets of high pollution. These environmental problems
are not peripheral issues of concern only to environmentalists. The global
economy, health, and modem civilization as we know it depends on these
planetary systems. Anything seriously threatening them also threatens the
human prospect.
The most menacing global peril arises from a massive increase of trace
gases, such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides and
chlorofluorocarbons. The increase in these gases has changed the atmosphere's
chemical composition resulting in global warming. In global warming we
confront a truly planetary environmental peril that cannot be controlled by
national regulation alone.
There is no doubt that global warming cannot be arrested by the actions
of individual states acting unilaterally. Only global norms and international
standards that are universally accepted will suffice. Such standards alone can
provide for the reduction of trace gases that are causing global warming.
Unfortunately, existing international law possesses neither the substantive law,
standards and remedies, nor the institutions, to confront the current planetary
environmental peril. What is required, therefore, is a new global treaty
creating standards accepted by all nations. The community of nations envisages
such a treaty which is scheduled to be negotiated at a world conference in 1992.
Recent attempts at international lawmaking have taught us some salutary
lessons. The world's nations, through fifteen years of protracted negotiations,
developed the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a
constitution for the oceans.3 Unfortunately, this major historic global treaty is
1. For a prescient reassessment of national security see L. BROWN, REDEFINING
NATIONAL SECURITY (1977). An elegant and compelling current restatement of the threats is
found in Mathews, Redefining Security, 69 FOREIGN AFF. 162 (1989).
2. Apart from global warming there are a host of problems of which three merit
mention: ozone depletion, destruction of bio-diversity, and the cycling of toxic chemical through
the environment. See infra note 194.
3. The saga of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has
been ably chronicled by Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea
Conference, 68 AM. J. INT. L. 1 (1974); The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT. L. (1975); The 1975 Geneva Session, 69
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rejected by the United States, West Germany, the United Kingdom and other
European nations because it does not accord with their national laws and
policies. The saga of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
contains a fundamental lesson for those seeking action on global warming:
international lawmaking cannot be divorced from national lawmaking. Indeed,
changes in national laws and policies may well constitute a vital step in the
creation of international laws and standards dealing with global warming.
Because international law is a consensual law it cannot be created or
applied without the help of powerful industrial nations. This is more
poignantly so in the case of international environmental law which can only be
upheld or effectively implemented with the support of the powerful economies
of the world. In fact, the most productive developments in international
environmental law have arisen out of domestic pressures within nations, and
domestic laws and policies have become the building blocks of international
law.4 If this country, the leading emitter of carbon dioxide in the world,5 could
formulate and adopt effective policies adaptable to the rest of the international
community, it would in fact provide a cure for the deficiencies of both national
and international law. In short United States environmental laws addressing
global warming, by integrating national, comparative and international
approaches, could offer globally rational and compelling legal responses to a
planetary peril. Conversely, United States reluctance to take steps to cut down
on the use of carbon dioxide will obstruct international accord. More
AM. J. INT. L. 763 (1975); Oxman, The Third United Nations Law of the Sea: The New York
Session, 72 AM. J. INT. L. 57 (1978); The Seventh Session (1978), 73 AM. J. INT. L. 1
(1979); The Eighth Session (1979) 74 AM. J. INT. L. 1 (1980); The Ninth Session (1980), 75
AM. J. INT. L. 211 (1981); and The Tenth Session (1981), 76 AM. J. INT. L. 1 (1982). A
useful narrative tracing the unfolding developments of UNCLOS forms the Introduction to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, reprinted in 21 INT. L. MATS. 1261 (1982).
4. For example, the environmental consequences of acid rain were made known to the
Swedish public by Swedish scientists in the 1960's. Public pressure prompted the Swedish
government to take action on acid rain within Sweden. Thereafter the government submitted a
case study on the environmental aspects of sulphur dioxide to the UN Conference on the Human
Environment 1972 (The Stockholm Conference). Wetstone, A History of the Acid Rain Issue,
in SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 165-66 (H. Brooks and G. Cooper eds. 1987). See also B.
BOLIN, AIR POLLUTION ACROSS BOUNDARIES: THE ON THE ENVIRONMENT OF SULPHUR IN
AIR AND PRECIPITATION, SWEDEN'S CASE STUDY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT IN STOCKHOLM (1972).
West Germany the third largest producer of sulphur dioxide in Western Europe was
originally unconcerned about international air pollution. This attitude of indifference soon
changed when experts revealed to the Federal Government that fully 500,000 hectacres or nearly
eight percent of Germany's forest area had been damaged by acid rain. G. WETSTONE & A.
ROSENCRANS, ACID RAIN IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: NATIONAL RESPONSES TO AN
INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 79-80 (1983). West Germany soon became the chief protagonist
within the European Common Market for controls on acid rain and in the enactment of the
European Common Market directive controlling air pollution from industrial plants. 84/360 EEC
OJ L188, 16-7-86.
The United States was one of the prime movers in the Montreal Protocol which regulated
chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) more seriously. See Doolittle, Underestimating Ozone Depletion:
The Meandering Road to the Montreal Protocol and Beyond, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 407, 421-22
(1989); Mintz, Keeping Pandora's Box Shut: A Critical Assessment of the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 565, 575 n.58
(1989). The United States was one of the first nations to have introduced legislation to curb
CFC's. See also Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 745-749.
5. The United States is the largest producer of carbon dioxide in the world. C.
FLAVIN, SLOWING GLOBAL WARMING: A WORLDWIDE STRATEGY 8 (1989). It is responsible
for 25% of the world's carbon dioxide emissions.
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strikingly, even if a global treaty places limits on the emission of carbon
dioxide, there is no guarantee that the United States will sign it. To avoid a
repetition of UNCLOS the laws against global warming should reflect national
thinking. The glaring lacuna in the law caused by problems that have
outstripped and outgrown the existing capacity of both national and
international legal systems can only be overcome by a new generation of
environmental laws that seek to integrate national and international law and
policy.
Encouragingly, a number of Bills now before Congress undertake the
urgent and compelling task of providing answers to global warming.6
Unfortunately, the underlying premises of these Bills have lacked coherence
and cogency. The rationales this article advocates are intended to provide
powerful, hitherto insufficiently articulated, jurisprudential and political
foundations supporting the vital objectives of these Bills, and to rebut a number
of objections that have been raised to the United States taking the vanguard in
fashioning global legal responses.
Part II will first explore a set of objections, straddling both United States
and international law and policy. They are based upon the scientific
uncertainties surrounding the existence, the effects, the consequences and the
implications of global warming. After disentangling the differing strands of
uncertainty giving rise to the objections, and assessing their validity, this
articles conclusion is unequivocal. Despite uncertainties, decisions cannot be
postponed until conclusive scientific proof is available. It might then be too late
to act. Scientific consensus indicates that global warming presents a real,
irreversible threat requiring immediate attention. We should use law to attend
to it.
Part II justifies the preceding conclusion by addressing the acceptability
of risks that are thought likely by most experts. It argues that there are deep
flaws in the science of risk assessment which misconceives of the nature of risk
and is used to minimize the dangers of global warming and to vindicate
inaction. Decisions about the acceptability of risks should not be reached
purely on the basis of statistical risk that is only concerned about technical
estimates of fatalities. There is a need to include, in risk analysis, the public
perception of risk (perceived risk) which encompasses a richer, more complex
version of risk. Risk assessment, by focusing upon human deaths, has largely
ignored the damage caused to nature, ecological systems, welfare and intangible
or non-utilitarian values.7 In the result, global warming which constitutes the
greatest of the identifiable, irreversible and irremediable threats to nature and
ecological systems,8 but is not seen as a great risk to human health,9 tends to be
glossed over as unimportant.
6. See infra note 258.
7. EPA, Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environmental
Problems, Overview Report, 5-7 (1987) [hereinafter Unfinished Business]. Ecological effects
are defined as effects on natural ecosystems caused by habitat modification and environmental
pollution on the fauna and flora of aquatic, and terrestrial environment systems. Welfare effects
include damage to agriculture, forestry and fisheries, recreation, and buildings to which a
monetary value can often be assigned.
8. Id. at 48, 55.
9. Id. at 34, 42.
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Resolving that the effects of global warming are unacceptable, the article
then offers three broad rationales under which the protection of nature could be
subsumed. First, a utilitarian rationale dictates that it is in the self-interest of
men and women that nature should be protected. Secondly, altruistic rationales
provide for ethics-based obligations. Nature centered ethics, which justify the
protection of nature in its own right, independent of humans, provides a third
rationale. Either singly, or in combination, these rationales seek to give nature
its rightful place in the assessment of environmental risks.
Part II concludes by dismissing a view held by some influential Bush
cabinet members and economists who argue that the United States should focus
on reducing the effects of global warming rather than addressing its source. A
problem as monumental as global warming calls for permanent solutions and
permanent solutions can only be achieved when causes are found and dealt with.
Part III addresses the political difficulties of integrating United States and
international law. Part HI(A) first explores the case for integration in the light
of the national security risk presented by global warming. It demonstrates the
need for integrating global and national efforts, and advocates a new generation
of United States laws that are focussed on integration. Part HI(B) continues to
deal with the political context of United States responses to global warming and
argues that a propitious climate for integrated law-making has arisen. This part
sketches a theoretical framework for lawmaking which demonstrates the
timeliness and feasibility of integration and supports a premier role for the
United States in controlling global warming. Rejecting public choice theories
as too cynical, the article instead adopts a republican theory of government and
supports this choice with empirical evidence. The article also adopts a "garbage
can" model of organizational choice 10 to show why and how the United States
should play a leadership role in this area. The enactment of law is possible
when the convergence of three streams: problem recognition, politics and
policy proposals occurs, and an entrepreneur emerges to guide the passage of
law.
"Problem recognition" has occurred because global warming is perceived
as a serious problem requiring action. There now is convincing evidence and
scientific consensus that a serious problem exists. "Politics" refers to the state
of public opinion, which is also currently strongly in favor of immediate,
effective environmental action to prevent global warming. "Policy proposals"
exist, and are offered in this article based on four areas of converging United
States and international concerns. The four areas consist of: (a) the need for
more research into the causes and effects of global warming; (b) a redefinition
of the atmosphere as a global commons or as the common heritage of mankind;
(c) institutionalizing obligations to posterity; and (d) protecting nature for its
own sake. These United States and international concerns lead to the conclusion
that carbon dioxide emissions should be cut by twenty percent by the year 2000.
10. The "garbage can" depicts "organized anarchy" in the political system where no
predictable theory or scientific process can identify problems or find solutions. Rather, salient
problems, possible solutions, and legislative opportunities will coexist as separate "streams" in
the "garbage can" (the system). Laws emerge where a problem becomes salient at the same time
as solutions become well regarded and legislative "entrepreneurs" favoring the solution are able
to control the legislative process for that end. See generally J. KINGDON, AGENDAS,
ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984).
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The only remaining element for lawmaking is an "entrepreneur." Part
II(C) argues that there is a need for United States entrepreneurship because of
the inherent weaknesses in international law, and the likelihood that such law
will not develop on its own. United States leadership is shown to be a necessary
catalyst in the formation of effective international law. Moreover, part III(D)
upholds and justifies the need for wise United States leadership and rebuts
political objections to such an United States role. It argues that, at an
international level, there is overwhelming evidence of an international
commitment to a 1992 treaty on global warming. To the extent that
international regulations will need to be implemented in this country it is in the
self-interest of the United States to determine and formulate policies and
principles, acceptable to itself, that could become international law.
Furthermore, in light of evidence that global warming is a national as well as
international problem which can seriously affect the United States, political
objections to finding global solutions through United States law become even
less weighty.
Finally, there are critical areas of law and policy in which the integration
of United States and international law is both politically and legally feasible.
Part III(E) of this article will deal with four of them: (a) the need for more
research into the causes and effects of global warming; (b) a redefinition of the
atmosphere as a global commons or as the common heritage of mankind; (c)
institutionalizing obligations to posterity; and (d) protecting nature for its own
sake.
In traversing the issues, the article will deal specifically with global
warming. It is evident, however, that we wrestle with generic questions that
could arise in many other areas of global concern. The present case study of
global warming could serve as a fruitful model, even a paradigm, for
addressing other second generation global problems.
II. SCIENCE AND POLICY
There are four fundamental and interlocking questions dealing with the
environmental perils surrounding global warming. The first relates to the
likelihood and causes of global warming. The second concerns the probable
effects of global warming. The third inquires as to the action that should be
taken, and the fourth asks if we should concentrate on dealing with the effects
rather than address the causes. Unfortunately, these four interlocking questions
have become coagulated in the exposition and explanations about global
warming and other environmental questions. These are interlocking issues, but
clarity is better served by disentangling them and accentuating their differences.
These four different but interlocking questions, are supposed to be
answered by applying rational scientific principles to objective data -- good
science.' In the United States, as well as the international community,
lawmakers have assumed that environmental laws should be based upon good
science. Good science is perceived as offering impartial conclusions based upon
objective evidence. It is important at the outset to point to two implications
arising from the dependence on science.
11. The expression "good science" is adopted from Latin. See Latin, Good Science,
Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 89 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988).
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The first underscores the strong reliance both United States and
international lawmaking place upon science. This mutual reliance renders the
United States more able and willing to explore the scientific likelihood of global
warming than a Western European state. Unlike Western European countries,
the United States accords science a unique pre-eminence. Here, the objectivity
of science has been grasped as a substitute for authoritative hierarchical
decisioinaking.12 In the light of the fragmented, pluralistic nature of United
States politics, 13 lawmakers and regulators need some objective basis on which
to make, justify, and defend their decisions. Such an objective assessment is
offered by good science.' 4
The status of "science in policy"'5 in the United States is mirrored if not
accentuated in international lawmaking. The-international legal system is still at
an embryonic stage of development and possesses no hierarchical authority.
International law is horizontal in nature, and lacks universal lawmaking, law
enforcing, or law interpreting agencies. The law can only arise with the
consent of states which, therefore, would need to be persuaded of the necessity
for law. In these circumstances the findings of science have become critical to
international decision making.' 6
To the extent that reliance is placed on science and scientific findings, it
may be assumed that science offers conclusive and determinative answers to the
questions asked of it. This brings up the second implication which can be
simply stated. It is that global warming cannot conclusively be proved by
scientific evidence.' 7 Popular assumptions about science as an objective
12. R. BRICKMAN, S. JASANOFF & T. ILGEN, CONTROLLING CHEMICALS 185-86
(1985). The authors suggest that as a rule Europeans rely more on the traditional authority of the
state and on the inclusion of affected interests in decision making. Science is used to support
rather than displace these as a source of authority. For historical and institutional reasons,
American regulators are deprived of the legitimizing advantages of unquestioned hierarchical
authority, while the co-optation of those affected is inconsistent with the adversarial nature of
environmental decision making. They therefore turn to scientific argumentation and other forms
of analysis that allow them to defend their decisions. Support for this thesis could also be drawn
from Vogel, who suggests that there is a mistrust of hierarchical decision making in the United
States. See D. VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OFREGULATION 280 (1986).
13. C. ENLOE, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECIVE 149-
51 (1975); D. VOGEL, supra note 12, at 276-80.
14. It has been suggested that there has been some loss of confidence in science. See
Coggin, Introduction. Governing Science and Technology Democratically: A Conceptual
Framework, in GOVERNING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN A DEMOCRACY 13-14 (M. Coggin
ed. 1986). The suggestion does not imply a crisis of confidence. Rather, it is a slipping from
the very high levels of respect in which scientists were held. Indeed, it has been observed in this
context that "regulators longingly seek the assurance from scientists regarding proper
extrapolation in risk assessment." F. CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER AND
THE LAW 57 (1989).
15. Brooks, The Scientific Advisor, in SCIENTISTS AND NATIONAL POLICY-MAKING
76 (R. Gilpin & C. Wright eds. 1964).
16. Hahn & Richards, The Internationalization of Environmental Regulation, 30
HARV. INT'L L.J. 421, 433 (1989). In the absence of other controlling forces, there is an
almost canonical belief that science can instruct decisionmakers not only about the nature of the-,
risk but also about what ought to be done about it. See also E. HAAS, M. WILLIAMS & D."
BABAI, SCIENTISTS AND WORLD ORDER 18-33 (1977).
17. A review of the scientific evidence is found in: INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF
SCIENTIFIC UNIONS (ICSU), SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON PROBLEMS OF THE ENVIRONMENT
(SCOPE); THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, CLIMATIC CHANGE, AND ECOSYSTEMS (B. Bolin, B.
D6t6s, J. Jiger & R. Warrick eds. 1986) [hereinafter THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT]; M. BARTH &
J. TITUS, GREENHOUSE EFFECT AND SEA LEVEL RISE (1984) [hereinafter GREENHOUSE
1990]
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cognitive activity that produces unimpeachable conclusions on which policy and
law are structured have never really been subscribed to by lawmakers. The
"scientific facts" might rhetorically be presented as if they represented objective
data. That often is not the case. Almost every legislative or regulatory action
governing environmental perils, in the United States or internationally, has
been beset with uncertainty. It is well known by law-makers that the endeavors
of scientists, and the conclusions offered by science (what will be described as
science in policy, or science for policy), is a goulash made up of many
uncertainties. Uncertainties surround the scientific modeling on which the
likelihood, the causes and the effects of global warming have been predicted.
We now turn to the facts and the uncertainties surrounding global warming.
A. The Likelihood
The earth's temperature rests on a delicate heat balance.18 Solar
radiation passes into the earth through the mass of gases found in the
atmosphere and is reflected back through the same gases. A complex system of
ocean and air currents, evaporation and precipitation, surface and cloud
reflection, and absorption form a involved feedback system for keeping the
global energy balance nearly constant. The fragility of this balance makes it
extremely important to assess the possibility and significance of climatic
changes. While our climate is the result of a gigantic and complicated system
that humans cannot control or direct, it is possible for human activities to
damage critical leverage points in the climatic system. In light of this
possibility, many fear whether such intervention in the form of increased
atmospheric concentration of "greenhouse" gases might affect the fragility of
the heat balance, 19 and lead to global warming. Greenhouse gases are trace
gases O such as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxides (NO2),
EFFECT AND SEA LEVEL RISE]; E. EL-HINNAwI & M. HASHMI, THE STATE OF THE
ENVIRONMENT, A UNEP REPORT (1987); ROYAL COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL
POLLUTION, TACKLING POLLUTION-EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS (Rep. No. 10, 1984)
[hereinafter ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT]; U.N. ENVT. PROGRAM, INT'L COUNCIL OF
SCIENTIFIC UNIONS, WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG. (UNEP/ICSU/WMO), REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND
OF OTHER GREENHOUSE GASES IN CLIMATE VARIATIONS AND ASSOCIATED IMPACTS (1986)[hereinafter UNEP/ICSU/WMO REPORT].
18. Solar radiation (sunlight) that is absorbed by the earth and warms the earth, must
be balanced by radiation in the form of heat that is re-emitted to space. Natural conditions in the
earth's atmosphere ensure that the global mean temperature will not fluctuate greatly over time.
However, a disruption in the radiation balance could cause relatively great fluctuations in the
global mean temperature over time. A reduction in the available energy from the sun by two
percent can, in theory, lower the global mean temperature by 2"C and produce an ice age.
STUDY OF CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (SCEP), MAN'S IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT 10 (1970) [hereinafter MAN'S IMPACT ON GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT].
19. Id. at 10. The importance of preserving global ecological and climatic balances
was recognized in July of 1989 at the meeting of the Group of Seven major industrialized
democracies in Paris, France; "There is a growing awareness throughout the world of the
necessity to preserve the global ecological balance. This includes serious threats to the
atmosphere, which could lead to future climatic changes." N.Y. Times, July 17, 1989,
International section, at 7.
20. The atmosphere is made up of 78.085% nitrogen; 20.95% oxygen; 0.93% argon.
The remaining 0.035% of the atmosphere consists of a mixture of less abundant gases of which
include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides, chloroflourocarbons, and ozone. These less
abundant gases are commonly referred to as "trace gases." W. SPROULL, AIR POLLUTION AND
ITS CONTROL 10 (1970).
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chlorofluorocarbons (CFC), and tropospheric ozone (03) which allow solar
radiation into the earth but prevent heat radiated by the earth from being
reflected back. Carbon dioxide is the most voluminous of the trace gases,
amounting to 0.03 percent of the atmosphere by volume, and illustrates the
dangers of the greenhouse effect.
For nearly one hundred years we have known that carbon dioxide traps
heat in the atmosphere.2 1 It does so because CO2 is transparent to, and allows
in, solar radiation (sunlight) that falls on the earth and heats it. The heated
earth returns or reflects radiation back to the atmosphere at longer wavelengths
than incoming solar radiation. CO2 is, however, relatively opaque to such
longer wavelengths and reflects or absorbs and re-emits that radiation back,
rather than letting it pass back to space, thus leading to the warming of the
earth and atmosphere.22 Glass too is transparent to solar radiation but not to
the longer wavelengths. When used in greenhouses glass traps heat giving rise
to the terms "greenhouse gas" and "greenhouse effects.'2
In the unperturbed atmosphere, carbon dioxide is circulated naturally
between the atmosphere, the oceans, and biosphere by physical and biological
processes. Human additions of great quantities of carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere may have disturbed the natural cycling of carbon dioxide.24 Half of
the carbon dioxide emitted into the air by the burning of fossil fuels remains in
the atmosphere, the other half is apportioned between the oceans and the
biosphere (plants, animals, and living things).25
There is no doubt that the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere is
growing. The pre-industrial concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide was
Moreover, because of the great attention that carbon dioxide has received as a greenhouse
gas, the remaining "trace gases" are also referred to as "other greenhouse gases" in literature that
is primarily focussed on carbon dioxide. See Bolle, Seiler & Bolin, Other Greenhouse Gases
and Aerosols, in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 17, at 157.
21. See Arrhenius, On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature
of the Ground, 41 PHIL. MAG. 237 (1896).
22. Most of the sun's radiation is visible light with a wavelength of 0.4 to 0.7 microns.
The earth's atmosphere (including the greenhouse gases) is transparent to radiation of this
wavelength. However, when the sun's radiation strikes the earth, the radiation is absorbed and
then re-emitted at a longer wavelength (because the earth is much cooler than the sun). This
radiation with a longer wavelength (greater than 0.7 microns) is known as infrared radiation
(heat). The greenhouse gases reflect or absorb and then re-emit the radiation back towards the
earth thus leading to a warming of the lower atmosphere. See generally J.R. GRIBBIN, FUTURE
WEATHER: CARBON DIOXIDE CLIMATE AND THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT 1170-73 (1983)
[hereinafter FUTURE WEATHER].
23. Compared with the earth, Mars has lower concentrations and Venus higher
concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. Temperature differences between
these planets may well be explained by the greenhouse effect and not merely by their distance
from the sun. For example, without the greenhouse effect, the temperature in Venus would be
about the same as earth. The atmosphere of Venus consists mostly of carbon dioxide that traps
heat over one hundred times more effectively than the earth's atmosphere. Venus is 400C.
Hansen, Johnson, Lacis, Lebedeff, Lee, Rind & Russell, Climate Impact of Increasing
Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, 213 SCI. 957, 957-66 (1981); Titus & Barth, An Overview of the
Causes and Effects of Sea Level Rise, in GREENHOUSE EFFECT AND SEA LEVEL RISE, supra
note 17, at 12.
24. E. EL-HINNAWI & H. HASHMI, supra note 17, at 18.
25. STUDY OF CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, MAN'S IMPACT ON
TERRESTRIAL AND OCEANIC ECOSYSTEMS 175 (W. Matthews, F. Smith & E. Goldberg eds.
1971) [hereinafter MAN'S IMPACT ON ECOSYSTEMS]; E. EL-HINNAWI & H. HASHMI, supra
note 17, at 18.
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about 280 parts of carbon dioxide per million parts of air by volume (ppm). It
reached 316 ppm in 1959, 338 ppm in 1980, and 343 ppm in 198426 and is
expected to increase to 560 by the middle and end of the next century if the
present annual increases of 1-2 percent continue. 27 There is broad agreement
that the increase of CO2 will result in the raising of temperatures in the lower
atmosphere and the earth's surface. 28
Other trace gases such as NO2, CFC, 03 and CH4 are also increasing and
compound the problem posed by carbon dioxide.29 Some experts suggest that a
doubling of these trace gases would have the same consequences as the doubling
of C0 2.30 Others estimate that, if present trends continue, the combined
concentration of CO2 and other greenhouse gases would effectively add up to a
doubling of CO2 as early as 2030.31
1. Uncertainty or Chaos?
There is, however, some disagreement regarding: (a) the critical role of
CO2 and other greenhouse gases in producing global warming and climatic
change; (b) the magnitude of such increases; and (c) the effects of global
warming. Along with the disagreements on the scientific account of the
greenhouse effect, there have also been disagreements on policy responses to
this scientific uncertainty. In mid-October 1983, two separate investigations
were simultaneously completed and publicized. One report, undertaken by the
EPA, was designed to shed light on the CO2 debate by evaluating the usefulness
of various strategies for slowing or limiting global warming. 32 The other
report, by the NAS (United States National Academy of Sciences), was designed
as a sustained attempt to assess the CO2 issue.33 The public policy thrust of each
report was substantially different. The EPA called for a robust policy response
within the next few years, while the NAS concluded that the need for a public
policy response was still decades away. In response to these conflicting reports,
George Keyworth, the presidential science advisor agreed with the NAS report
26. E. EL-HINNAWI & H. HASHMI, supra note 17, at 18; ROYAL COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 17, at 156.
27. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON
FUTURE 175 (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE]; UNEP/ICSU/WMO REPORT, supra
note 17. Other estimates vary from 370 ppm to 2100 ppm in the year 2100. E. EL-HINNAWI &
H. HASHMI, supra note 17, at 19.
28. The uncertainty on other matters is considerable, but there is almost unanimous
agreement that a substantial warming would occur. Bolin, Jdiger, D66s, A Synthesis of Present
Knowledge, in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 17, at 27.
29. See Dickinson & Cicerone, Future Global Warming From Atmospheric Trace
Gases, 319 NATURE 109 (1986).
30. Non-CO. greenhouse gases now add to the greenhouse effect at a rate comparable
to that of CO2. Hansen, Lacis, Rind, Russell, Fung, Ashcraft, Lebedeff, Ruedy & Stone, The
Greenhouse Effect: Projections of Global Climate Change, in EPA, UNEP, EFFECTS OF
CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE, VOLUME 1: OVERVIEW 205 (J.
Titus ed. 1986).
31. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 27, at 175.
32. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CAN WE DELAY A
GREENHOUSE WARMING? ii (1983).
33. CARBON DIOXIDE ASSESSMENT COMMrITEE, CHANGING CLIMATE xiv (1983).
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and dismissed the EPA's findings as "unwarranted and unnecessarily
alarmist."34
The fact that an increase of CO2 will theoretically lead to higher
temperatures has been confirmed in experimental conditions, and there is
"virtually no controversy" about the greenhouse effect itself as a bio-physical
phenomenon.35 However, the pattern of factors that determine climate is
extremely complex, and there is some dissent as to whether global wanning and
climatic changes are actually taking place.36 To begin with, CO2 from fossil
fuels is only a small part of the natural CO2 that is constantly exchanged
between atmosphere and oceans and atmosphere and the forests. Second, there
is no certainty about how the carbon dioxide going into oceans and biosphere
are divided between these two reservoirs. 37 There is also considerable
uncertainty about the role of the oceans in absorbing CO2 38 and mediating
temperatures. 39 Oceanographers are about to embark on a ten year global
survey of the oceans to sketch a worldwide picture of its gyres, eddies, and
currents. Their hope is that the survey will aid scientists to understand how
much heat the oceans move around the planet and how much atmospheric gases
the oceans absorb.40 It could well be argued that any major policy action
34. Cooper, The C0, Challenge, in SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 204 (H. Brooks, C.
Cooper eds. 1987) [hereinafter SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY].
35. Climate Surprises: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and
Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
7 (1989) (statement of Dr. S. Schneider, Section Head Interdisciplinary Climate Systems,
National Center for Atmospheric Research) [hereinafter Schneider].
36. This debate focuses on the question of whether the buildup of greenhouse gases is
significantly contributing to the present climate change, or if this change is simply a result of
natural climate variability relatively unaffected by increasing atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases. The skepticism, in part, is due to the poor understanding of the causes of
past climatic change and the uncertainty involved in using past climate patterns as analogs for
predicting future climate trends. See Wigley, Jones & Kelly, Empirical Climate Studies, in THE
GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 17, at 287. Skeptics argue that changes in atmospheric
carbon dioxide concentrations have a relatively small effect on climatic change. See, e.g., Idso,
Carbon Dioxide: An Alternative View, 92 NEW SCI. 444 (1981); Newell & Dopplick, Questions
Concerning the Possible Influence of Anthropogenic CO2 on Atmospheric Temperature, 18 J.
APPL. METEOROL. 822 (1979).
37. See E. EL-HINNAWI & H. HASHMI, supra note 17, at 18; MAN'S IMPACT ON
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 25, at 11.
38. Scientific research has suggested that the effects of increasing concentrations of
atmospheric carbon dioxide caused by anthropogenic (man-made) emissions may be mitigated
by an oceanic response that absorbs atmospheric carbon dioxide. The chemical concept of
equilibrium explains how absorption occurs. When the relative concentration of atmospheric
carbon dioxide increases, the oceans respond by absorbing more gaseous carbon dioxide from
the atmosphere to the point that the two medium (air and water) are in equilibrium. However,
the extent to which this phenomenon would mitigate the buildup of atmospheric carbon dioxide
is uncertain mainly due to the poor understanding of the rate at which surface ocean water is
mixed into deeper layers of ocean. The amount of carbon dioxide that can be absorbed depends
on the rate at which the layers mix and the depth at which mixing can take place. For a detailed
discussion of oceanic absorption of carbon dioxide, see Bolin, How Much CO, Will Remain in
the Atmosphere?, in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 17, at 113-18.
39. The ability of the upper ocean to absorb heat from the atmosphere is potentially
great enough to delay for several decades the establishment of a higher atmospheric equilibrium
temperature associated with the increase of greenhouse gases. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
(UNITED STATES), CO,/CLIMATE REVIEW PANEL: CARBON DIOXIDE AND CLIMATE, A
SECOND ASSESSMENT 2 (1982) [hereinafter CARBON DIOXIDE AND CLIMATE].
40. The Chronicle of Higher Education, August 16, 1989, at A6-A8.
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should await a fuller understanding of the oceanic role. Furthermore, volcanic
and solar activities also account for increases in temperature. 41
Third, the evidence offered about rising temperatures is somewhat
equivocal. Periodical natural fluctuations of global mean temperatures are well
documented by geological evidence.4 2 Moreover, global mean temperatures
increased about 0.4 degrees centigrade over the last century though
temperatures on the northern biosphere actually decreased by about 0.5 degrees
between 1940 and 1970, a period of rapid CO2 increase. 43 Finally, forecasts of
temperature rises of between 1.5 and 4.5"C, with warming becoming more
pronounced at higher latitudes during winter than at the equator, utilize models
that simplify the complexities of climate and involve many assumptions 44
Critics question both the simplification and the assumptions, pointing out that
many models predict that a global warming of at least 1 degree centigrade
should have occurred over the past 100 years in response to increasing levels of
41. During the earth's history, natural fluctuations of the earth's surface temperature
have, in part, been caused by volcanic and solar activities. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 17, at 158-59. First, there seems to be a very good correlation between historic ups
and downs of temperature and number of sunspots. A high sunspot number means that the sun
is more active. Second, large amounts of fine ash and dust from volcanic eruptions which is
suspended in the atmosphere is believed to reflect incoming solar radiation. See generally
FUTURE WEATHER, supra note 22, at 109-54.
42. The most documented periods of past climates which were much warmer than
present are the early Holocene post-glacial epoch, 6000-9000 years ago, with observations
indicating local summer temperatures at least 1' to 2"C warmer than present, and the Cretaceous
period, about 100 million years ago with temperatures 10" to 20' C warmer. However, it is
believed that there was a greater concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere during the
Cretaceous period than in the present. Dickinson, How Will Climate Change?, in THE
GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 17, at 229-30.
43. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 158-59. This data illustrates the
difficulty of finding quantitative evidence that will relate the concentration of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere and changing climate conditions.
44. Models are mathematical representations of the atmosphere, oceans, and important
components of the climate system. They embody our current understanding of the factors that
determine the earth's climate. The factors or processes include: solar activity and the earth's
orbital characteristics; the composition, radiative properties and circulation of the atmosphere; the
chemical, physical and thermodynamical properties of the oceans; precipitation; streamflow, soil
moisture content, evaporation, and cloudiness; the spatial distribution of ice and snow cover; the
behavior of forests, plankton and other biological populations. Global Climate Change:
Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Oceanography and the Great Lakes of the Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1989) (Statement of Dr. Andrew
R. Solow) [hereinafter Solow]. They are premised on basic universal physical laws such as the
conservation of mass and energy and motion. In other words, instead of actually building a
physical analogue of the land-ocean-atmosphere system, mathematical expressions for physical
principles, such as energy conservation and Newton's law of motion that govern those systems,
are devised. A computer then calculates how the climate will evolve in accordance with those
laws. Schneider, supra note 35, at 13. "The justification of such a mathematical construct is
solely and precisely that it is expected to work." John von Neuman, cited in J. GLEICK,
CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE at 273 (1987) [hereinafter CHAOS]. Three-dimensional
models, which are the most complex models used, make major assumptions, partly to reduce the
computations and partly because the processes are insufficiently understood. The areas of
greatest uncertainty concern the roles of the oceans, clouds, and particulates in the atmosphere.
ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17. The waxing and waning of glaciers and forests,
and the motions of the earth's crust. However, most scientists believe that results from the most
recent models are the best estimates in light of current knowledge. These results should not be
considered as accurate estimations, but rather as predictions based on particular scenarios. Id.
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atmospheric carbon dioxide. What has actually taken place is a warming of half
a degree or less.45
The great power of science lies in the ability to relate cause and effect.
On the basis of the laws of gravitation, for example, tides are scheduled and
eclipses are predicted thousands of years in advance. It should be possible for a
computer, applying Newtonian principles and physical laws of the universe, to
make predictions as accurate as those relating to eclipses and tides. Such
predictions are possible because the movements of the atmosphere obey the laws
of physics just as much as the movements of the planets. Until recently there
was little reason to doubt that precise predictability could in principle be
achieved. It was assumed that it was only necessary to gather and process a
sufficient amount of information. Many scientists believed that an approximate
knowledge of a system's conditions, and an understanding of the laws of nature,
enabled one to calculate the approximate behavior of the system.46 Such a
belief has been altered by the discovery of randomness.47
Structured upon the randomness of nature's behavior, the theory of chaos
places fundamental limits on the ability to make predictions. 48 This is a more
elemental objection than those premised upon the incompleteness of weather
modes or the absence of good data. Randomness in nature accounts for the fact
that forecasts are still stated in terms of probabilities. 49 The weather, the flow
of a mountain stream, the roll of the dice all have unpredictable aspects. Since
there is no clear relation between cause and effect, such phenomena are said-to
have random elements.
Scientists have long recognized, as a working problem, that
measurements can never be perfect. But they assume, on the basis of
approximation, that small influences can be neglected because they do not blow
up to have arbitrarily large dimensions. 50 The belief in approximation has been
shattered in two ways. To begin with, quantum mechanics has found that there
is a fundamental limitation to the accuracy with which the position and velocity
of a particle can be measured. 5' Second, the presence of randomness would
result in the exponential amplification of errors, and where there is a pattern of
randomness due to chaotic dynamics, the predictions become almost useless.
The final result according to chaos scientists is that: "Quantum mechanics
implies that initial measurements are always uncertain, and chaos ensures that
the uncertainties will quickly overwhelm the ability to make them."52
45. Solow, supra note 44, at 24.
46. CHAOS, supra note 44, at 15.
47. Crutchfield, Farmer, Packard & Shaw, Chaos, Scd. AM. 46-57 (1986) [hereinafter
Crutchfield]. The account of chaos theory is heavily dependent on CHAOS. See supra note 44.
48. CHAOS, supra note 44, draws on the work of about two hundred scientists to
present a eminently readable and intelligible account of the new science. Id. at 318.
49. "To most serious meteorologists, forecasting was less than a science. It was a
seat-of-the-pants business performed by technicians who needed some intuitive ability to read
the next day's weather in the instruments and the clouds." Id. at 13.
50. Id. at 15. "A tiny error in fixing the position of Comet Halley in 1910 would only
cause a tiny error in predicting its arrival in 1986, and the error would stay small for millions of
years to come. Computers rely on the same assumption in guiding spacecraft: approximately
accurate input gives approximately accurate output."
51. Crutchfield, supra note 47, at 48.
52. Id. at 49.
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It is difficult, however, to evaluate what the impact of chaos might be.
Chaos scientists believe that chaos, paradoxically, is structured, and has a
pattern to it.53 They continue to use computers to model. When doing so they
do not gloss over or ignore randomness in the way of Newtonian physicists, 54
but look for patterns of randomness. Despite chaos, the majority of scientists
continue to rely on modeling as a method of forecasting. In the case of global
warming, the models they have constructed differ from one another in
mathematical detail, in the relative emphasis of the various physical processes
included in the model, in the manner in which the atmosphere is represented,
and in the results offered. But they "all agree in showing that the continued
increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will result in a rapid heating of
the earth's surface, and it is this agreement that has led to a broad scientific
consensus that the projections of a warmer climate should be taken seriously."55
There are impressive reasons that empirically verify and confirm the
accuracy of models and strengthen the prevailing scientific consensus. First,
mathematical models have been used to explain the evolution of past climates,
including those of the ice ages and the Cretaceous period (the final age of the
dinosaurs). The ability of models to reproduce the diverse climates of the
Mesozoic era and glacial/interglacial cycles lends strong supporting evidence to
their ability to predict the future.56 Second, general-circulation models do
remarkably well at mapping the seasonal cycle. The seasonal cycle is a good
test because the temperature changes involved are large-several times larger
than the change from an ice age to an interglacial period. Scientists view this as
an encouraging validation of "fast physics," such as cloudiness change.57 Third,
it is possible to isolate individual physical components of a model and test them
against real data from the field, or a high resolution sub-model.5 8
As for long term model based predictions, chaos may not be as
destructive of general predictions about global warming as might appear at first
glance. Predictions of global warming involve global trends of massive
proportions, not exact and accurate predictions and minuscule details. We are
not concerned, for example, with models that attempt to predict the precise
movement of a splash of water, under a particular rock, below a designated
53. CHAOS, supra note 44, at 76.
54. Id.
55. Climate Surprises: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and
Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 101 Cong., 1st Sess.
13 (1989) (statement of Dr. John Firor, Director, Advanced Study Program, National Center for
Atmospheric Research) [hereinafter Firor].
56. Schneider, supra note 35, at 14, 19. The geologic record contains a rich
storehouse of evidence that could confirm or rebut the model's results. Geologists are able to
interpret the evidence from the geologic record to reconstruct a history of climate. For example,
ice cores from glaciers preserve records of past temperatures, precipitation, atmospheric dust
content and past changes in the atmosphere. Sediment cores from lakes and oceans contain long
histories of changing climate. By examining evidence of the same age from many localities,
from both terrestrial and marine sites, it is possible to recreate "snapshots" of global conditions
in different climatic era. Climate Surprises: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science,
Technology and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1989) (Statement of D. Peck). These snapshots, of an age at which no
climatic records were kept, can offer confirmation or rebuttal of the model's reconstruction of
climate.
57. Schneider, supra note 44, at 18. This does not, however, indicate how well a
model simulates slow processes such as changes in deep ocean circulation.
58. Id.
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bridge, at a specified time.59 Instead, the comparison is more analogous to an
inquiry as to whether a river is changing course. Climatic modeling on global
warming does not involve anything as exacting as predicting the weather in
Princeton, New Jersey, 182 days from a given date. 60 Instead it is more like
predicting that Princeton, New Jersey will have rain within 182 days.
2. Decisionmaking
A serious and controversial question that arises in this context is what
decisions, if any, should be made in the face of strong but not conclusive
evidence of the likelihood of global warming. In answering this question it
behoves to be observed that risk is an inherent condition of modem living.61
Consequently, the issue of global warming is but a species in the broad genus of
risk avoidance, and other analogous cases become instructive.
The history of chemical risks and technology in general reveals the
disturbing extent to which their introduction was characterized by ignorance
about their eventual consequences. 62 Billions of pounds of dangerous chemicals
were produced and used before they were found to be carcinogens. For
example, 100 billion pounds of ethylene dichloride and five billion pounds of
vinyl chloride a year were produced before tests showed them to cause
cancer. 63 The story repeats itself for DDT and a host of other chemicals,
where there have been long intervals between the exposure to a chemical and
the discovery of symptoms. The dangers posed by the "latency" period, as the
devastating time lag has euphemistically been designated, have led inexorably to
demands that decisions be made about the risks posed by chemicals despite
"pervasive uncertainty."'64
Similarly, the question whether a substance causes cancer or other
adverse health effects assumes an affirmative or negative answer. Yet there are
few chemicals on which the human data is unequivocal. Conclusive direct
evidence of a threat to human health is rare. Fewer than thirty chemicals are
definitely linked with cancer in humans. In contrast, some 1,500 are reportedly
carcinogenic in animals.65 Ethical considerations prevent deliberate human
experiments with potentially dangerous chemicals, while the length of the
latency period for cancer and other effects complicate epidemiologic studies.
Thus, animal models are used to investigate whether exposure to chemicals is
related to human health effects. Scientists consider the effects on laboratory
animals and extrapolate the results to humans. 66 A positive answer to the
question whether a chemical causes cancer in animals is treated as evidence that
it may pose a threat to humans.67 The inference that results from animals are
59. Crutchfield, supra note 47, at 48.
60. CHAOS, supra note 44, at 21.
61. Gillette & Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027 (1990).
62. For instance, the British Royal Commission on the Motor Car of 1908 viewed the
most serious problem of the automobile to be the dust thrown up from untarred roads. D.
COLLINGRIDGE, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY 16 (1980).
63. Ramo, Regulation of Technological Activities: A New Approach, in SCIENCE AND
LAW: AN ESSENTIAL ALLIANCE 38 (W. Thomas ed. 1983).
64. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS, 11-12 (1983) [hereinafter RISK ASSESSMENT].
65. Id. at 11.
66. Id. at 12.
67. Id. at 19.
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applicable to humans is fundamental to toxicologic research, 68 despite known
metabolic differences between animals and humans, 69 and the absence of
evidence establishing human carcinogenicity as a scientific fact.
The need for early risk evaluation is a lesson bitterly learned, and the
importance of recognizing false negatives in toxic testing has been penetratingly
illustrated by Talbot Page.70 Erroneous tests may indicate that a toxic chemical
is not toxic or that a non-toxic chemical is toxic. The latter type of error is
called a false alarm in environmental risk assessment but there is no common
name for the former. Page designates the former a false negative and the
latter a false positive. The part false negatives play is vividly exposed by
advances in analytical chemistry.
The case of ethylene dibromide (EDB), a soil, fruit and grain fumigant,
illustrates a typical example in which a chemical caused unforeseen harm.71
Using the technique of risk assessment72 scientists determined EDB to be toxic
at the hazard identification stage, and found that it gave rise to dangerous
responses at the stage of dose-response assessment. At the exposure assessment
stage, however, scientists determined that there had been "zero" (i.e. non-
detectable) amounts of toxic chemicals present in soil, grain, and food. This led
to the conclusion that EDB was not harmful to human health because it did not
migrate further up the food chain from the nematodes (microscopic root eaters)
in the field, fruit flies in citrus crops, and weevils in stored grain at which it
had been directed.
The concept of "zero" has been rapidly retreating in the face of
advancing analytical chemistry. In the 1970's, analytical chemistry capabilities
advanced to a point where it was possible to detect trace amounts of EDB in
fruit, grain and grain products, where previously there had been findings of
zero. EDB was clearly found to be advancing up the food chain. Further
discoveries revealed that EDB had leached into groundwater. After a close
consideration of the costs and benefits of their action, the EPA decided to ban
the use of EDB. The same belated recognition of toxicity, after enormous
harm had been caused, is true of DDT and many other chemicals."
The consequences of a false negative about one dangerous substance can
be serious. The consequences of a false negative concerning the more serious
68. Id. at 22.
69. For example, when determining the response of different species to chemicals,
many chemicals appear to be carcinogenic in one species or strain and not in another - even
when only rodents are being compared. Office of Science and Technology, Policy, Chemical
Carcinogens, Review of the Science and its Associated Principles, 49 Fed. Reg. 21594, 21596
(1984).
70. Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q.
207 (1978).
71. This account is taken from COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALUTY 1984: 15TH ANNUAL REPORT 201-07 (1986).
72. Risk assessment involves one or more of the four stages of: (a) hazard
identification - the determination of whether a chemical is causally linked to particular health
effects; (b) dose-response assessment - the relation between the magnitude of exposure and the
probability of health effects; (c) exposure assessment - the determination of the extent of
human exposure before or after the regulatory control; (d) risk characterization of the nature and
magnitude of human risk - a judgmental decision that requires no additional scientific
knowledge. See RISK AssFssMENT, supra note 64, at 20-28.
73. Hornig, Science and Government in the USA, in SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY,
supra note 34, at 22-23.
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effects of global warming would be disastrous. There are some who view the
fear of false negatives as irrational, and false negatives themselves as phantom
dragons. These skeptics ridicule the contention that to wait until we are sure
about climatic change may be to wait until it is too late. According to Solow,
such an argument, applies equally to an invasion by aliens from space. More
seriously, this argument neglects the cost of overreaction.74 A response that is
efficient under a rapid change of large magnitude may be a costly mistake
under a slower change of more modest magnitudeJ 5
This view fails to recognize the mounting evidence that we face a real
dragon. To start, scientists while hopelessly divided on other environmental
issues involving cause and effect,76 are almost unanimous about the very real
possibility of global warming. The same measure of certainty about a Martian
invasion would clearly provide good cause for action. Second, it may be
possible to obtain conclusive proof of global warming in another decade or
two. 77 Delaying action for another decade or two will, however, not be cost
free if global warming takes place. Assuming an optimistic one degree
centigrade increase, we will still need to adapt much faster to the newer changes
at greater expense. With an increase of four to five degrees centigrade or more
we might find ourselves overtaken by catastrophe. Society is faced with a
classic example of the need to make decisions with imperfect information.
Alan Weinberg has given the name transcientific to high policy questions
that may be asked of science but are not answerable by science. 7s The question
whether global warming is taking place is one such transcientific question.
There is an overwhelming consensus that something very disturbing is
happening. Decisions may be deferred until conclusive scientific proof is
available where we are certain not to be overtaken by the feared peril. But
global warming provides no certainty. When we confront irreversible effects
the cost of postponement might be too high. Lawmakers have rightly assumed
that decisions should be taken despite uncertainty. Postponing action on the
basis of a false negative - a wrong finding that something does not pose a risk
- could be disastrous. The only way to obtain direct and conclusive evidence
is to incur the risk involved. Such a course of action would be foolhardy where
the disaster is irreversible.
The scientific evidence points to the likelihood, though not the certainty,
of a global threat. The argument of this paper is that such a likelihood of harm
warrants the adoption of remedial measures. Despite the fact that action
regarding chemicals has been taken on the basis of what might be likely, it
could still be argued that the kind of socioeconomic disruption caused by global
warming is so enormous that it might be better to defer action until stronger
74. Solow, Pseudo-Scientific Hot Air, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1988, A15, col. 1.
75. Solow, supra note 44, at 24.
76. For example, scientists are often divided about the suitability of the models used in
the field of dose-response extrapolation (from high level exposure in animal bioassays to lower
level exposure in man) to predict carcinogenicity. See F. CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY
INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW 54-58 (1989).
77. Global Warming: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Testimony of S.
Schneider).
78. Weinberg, Science and its Limits: The Regulator's Dilemma, in NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, HAZARDS: TECHNOLOGY AND FAIRNESS 9-11 (1986);
Weinberg, Science and Trans-science, X MINERVA 209 (1971).
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evidence is forthcoming. This argument is untenable for the reasons we have
already examined. In addition, there is a further political argument that invites
attention.
When faced with a likely new Soviet threat, giving rise to global
insecurity in the aftermath of the Second World War, the western powers
agreed that a credible defense of Western Europe was necessary. There was
less agreement on how to execute that commitment, but on the need for action
to avert the threat to security there was no doubt.79 Despite the easing of
tensions, the need for massive expenditure on military preparation to meet a
likely threat, has continued to be the conceptual linchpin of defense policy.
Those who are convinced of the necessity to incur enormous expenses against
an attack that is likely but not certain, can hardly demand a more onerous
standard of proof from others seeking action against global warming.
We have arrived at a situation where it is rational to conclude that global
warming is likely. But what action should we take? In order to answer this
question, it seems prudent and wise to ascertain the consequences of such
disturbances. Such an awareness will enable us to make informed decisions as
to the nature of the action, if any, arising from our evaluation of the evidence.
B. The Effects
The effects of global temperature rises vary with the extent and rapidity
of the increase. Historically, climatic changes have been staggered over many
centuries enabling plants and animals to adapt. For example, during the Ice
Age 18,000 years ago, temperatures warmed about 5°C (9"F) over thousands of
years but rose slowly enough to allow for adaptation.8o To study the effects of
global warning, experts have developed "scenarios" to illustrate the possible
effects of certain mean global rises in temperature. In some areas of the world,
an increase of loC81 would have helpful effects. A modest warming in the far
northern latitudes could carry some advantages for such countries as Canada,
China, and the Soviet Union: resources in their arctic regions would become
more accessible and more easily exploitable. On the other hand, and increase
of 1°C could well be accompanied by non-trivial consequences especially with
regard to climate-sensitive localized sectors of national economies.82 A I*C
temperature increase could shift the corn belt area of the United States by over
79. This is an almost obvious point. For a historical survey see Schwartz, A Historical
Perspective, in ALLIANCE SECURITY: NATO AND THE NO-FIRST-USE QUESTION 5-9 (J.
Steinbruner & L. Sigal eds. 1983).
80. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE POTENTIAL
EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES, EXECUTIvE SUMMARY 8
(1988) [hereinafter UNITED STATEs CLIMATIC CHANGE].
81. When experts discuss the global effects of a warming of the atmosphere in terms of
a I*C rise or a 2-4.5C rise in temperature it is important to keep in mind that these are mean
global increases. Temperature increases significantly higher than the projected mean increase
with attendant changes in precipitation patterns will occur in latitudes north and south of the
equator. Cooper, The CO2 Challenge, in SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 34, at 207.
82. Some regional areas of the world would be particularly sensitive to increases in
temperature. For example, an area that is economically based on agricultural crops that are
sensitive to small climatic changes would suffer more than areas that may not be hurt or even
benefited by small rises in temperature. See id. at 208.
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100 kilometers northward.83 Rises of between 2-4.5"C could present much
greater problems.
Modeling studies have suggested that increased CO2 concentrations could
slow the atmospheric heat engine that is driven by the differences between
equatorial and polar climates. This could change the hydrological cycle and
affect rainfall patterns.84 Tropics and eastern coasts of continents could become
wetter while sub-tropics would become drier and increase in area toward
higher latitudes.85 Although higher carbon dioxide concentrations per se may
increase plant growth86 and increase water-use efficiency,87 increased
temperatures are detrimental to agriculture on the whole.88
Crop impact analyses show that warmer average temperatures of one to
four degrees centigrade are detrimental to both wheat and maize yields in the
Great Plains and in Western Europe. Average yields may be reduced from
between three percent and seventeen percent.89 It could also lead to sea level
rises ranging between 25 and 140 centimeters. 90 A rise in the upper range
would lead to the invading sea submerging whole cities, agricultural land,
fragile ecological coastlands, as well as swamping dump sites and salinating
freshwater aquifers. 91 Such a scenario will lead to socioeconomic and
environmental problems of striking magnitude. 92
83. Id. at 208. This illustrates the possibility that seemingly insignificant average
temperature changes could have very real consequences in terms of an increase in the frequency
of such low-probability events sitch as droughts, crop failures, and floods.
84. See Manabe, The Effect of Increasing the CO2 Concentration on the Climate of a
General Circulation Model, in DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, CARBON DIOXIDE EFFECTS
RESEARCH AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: WORKSHOP ON THE GLOBAL EFFECTS OF CARBON
DIOXIDE FROM FOSSIL FUELS 100-01 (W. Elliot & L. Machta eds. 1979); see also Dickinson,
How Will Climate Change?, in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 17, at 249-52; ROYAL
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 159.
85. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 159.
86. Under laboratory conditions, increased atmospheric CO2 conditions increase the
rate of photosynthesis and nitrogen fixation in some plants. Warrick, Gifford, & Parry, CO,
Climatic Change andAgriculture, in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 17, at 406.
87. Stomata (microscopic pores on the leaf surface) allow the inward diffusion of
carbon dioxide used in photosynthesis and, at the same time, allow the loss of transpired water.
An increase in the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration could reduce the opening of the
stomata required to allow a given amount of carbon dioxide to enter the plant and might thus
reduce the loss of water from a plant. Id. at 402-05.
88. In most regions of the country, climate change alone could reduce site to site
dryland yields of corn, wheat, and soybeans, with losses ranging from negligible amounts to
80%. These decreases are primarily the result of higher temperatures, which shorten a crop's
life cycle. UNITED STATES CLIMATIC CHANGE, supra note 80, at 21. See also E. EL-HINNAWI
& H. HASHMI, supra note 17, at 23; Warrick, Gifford & Parry, supra note 86, at 425.
89. UNEP/ICSU/WHO REPORT, supra note 17; UNEP/IIASA, CLIMATE IMPACT ON
AGRICULTURE (1986); See also Warrick, Gifford & Parry, supra note 98, at 425; EL-HINNAWI
& HASHMI, supra note 27, at 23.
90. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 17, at 176; E. EL-HINNAWI & H. HASHMI,
supra note 17, at 22. Other predictions range from a sea level rise of 56 cm by the year 2100 to
a sea level rise of 345 cm by the year 2100. Titus & Barth, An Overview of the Causes and
Effects of Sea Level Rise, in GREENHOUSE EFFECT AND SEA LEVEL RISE, supra note 17, at
16; Robin, Changing the Sea Level, in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 17, at 355.
91. See Titus & Barth, supra note 90, at 19-21.
92. Even more dramatic changes have been forecast. It has been suggested that global
warming could lead to the melting of the marine west Antarctic ice sheet raising the global sea
level by several meters. Mercer, West Antarctic Ice Sheet and CO, Greenhouse Effect: A Threat
of Disaster, 271 NATURE 321-25 (1978). Evidence exists that the West Antarctic Ice Sheet
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1. Climatic Change in the United States
The most comprehensive study on the environmental effects of climate
change in the United States has been undertaken by the EPA.93 The EPA study
analyzed the potential impact of global climatic change in the United States
within seven broad areas: sea level rise; water resources; agriculture; forests;
biodiversity; health; and air pollution. It also focused upon four regions
presenting climatological, ecological, hydrological and economic diversity
where changes might be expected. They were the Southeast, the Great Plains,
California, and the Great Lakes.
The study concludes that a rise in sea levels is one of the most certain
impacts of climate change. 94 Some scientists fear that an estimated rise of
between 50 and 200 cm 95 will drown coastal wetlands, 96 inundate coastal
lowlands, 97 increase coastal flooding, erode beaches and increase salinity in
estuaries and coastal aquifers. 98 While rainfall will vary within regions of the
continental United States, it is unlikely that current rainfall patterns will remain
the same.99 It is certain that higher temperatures will increase evaporation and
reduce snowpack. The rainfall in the United States falls more heavily on the
east than the west and changes in temperature alone will cause new stresses in
water resource management particularly in the west. Even without rainfall
decline higher temperatures alone will likely lead to lower riverflow and lake
levels. 00 In California, for example, decreased water availability and increased
demand for irrigation may intensify conflicts between agricultural and urban
use.101 Higher temperatures may degrade water quality.' 02
completely melted during previous global wanings, raising sea levels by 5-6 meters 120,000
years ago. Hoffman, Estimates of Future Sea Level Rise, in GREENHOUSE EFFECT AND SEA
LEVEL RISE, supra note 17, at 94. On the other hand there now appears to be consensus among
glaciologists that any problem of this scale is long term and unlikely to occur in the next century
or two. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 159; see also Hoffman, Estimates of
Future Sea LevelRise, in GREENHOUsE EFFECT AND SEA LEVEL RISE, supra note 17, at 94.
93. See UNITED STATES CLIMATIC CHANGE, supra note 80.
94. Id. at 14. According to the report the sea level could arise out of thermal expansion
as well as the melting of glaciers.
95. The study estimated the potential nationwide loss of wetlands, and the cost of
defending currently developed areas from the rising sea for three scenarios (50, 100 and 200 cm)
of sea level rise. Id. at 16.
96. Historically, wetlands have kept pace with a slow rate of sea level rise. The report
argues that in the future, sea level will probably rise too fast for marshes and swamps to keep
pace. If there were to be a one meter rise in the sea level, 26-66% of coastal wetland would be
lost if wetland migration is not blocked by bulkheads and levees. If all shorelines were
protected, total wetland losses would increase to 50-82 percent, because bulkheads and levees
would prevent the formation of inland wetlands. Id. at 15.
97. If so there would be a need to hold back the sea. Given high property values of
developed coastlines, for a one meter rise the capital cost of protecting currently developed areas
until the year 2100 is estimated at $73-111 billion (in 1988 dollars). Id.
98. For example, there may be an enlarged and more saline Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta, while New York, Miami and other coastal communities would have to increase the current
efforts to combat salinity increases in ground and surface water supplies. Id. at 19.
99. Id.
100. Due to increased rates of evaporation. Id.
101. The resolution of conflicts between urban water requirements and recreational and
ecological uses, may intensify the conflict between municipal and agricultural use. The trend
toward such a conflict is illustrated by National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine
County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983) (the Mono Lake case). The
facts of this case reveal that the City of Los Angeles has taken virtually the entire flow of the five
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Agriculture contributed 17.5 percent of the GNP of the United States in
1985. The United States produces nearly fifty percent of the world's corn and
nearly sixty percent of its soybeans.10 3 The immense productivity of United
States farmland has been a major reason why the United States has evolved into
a giant economic power. 104 Crop production is sensitive to temperature,
precipitation, soils, and irrigation. During the dust bowl years of the 1930's
wheat and corn yields dropped by up to fifty percent, and during the drought of
1988, estimates of corn yield showed a decline of thirty-seven percent.1o5
Climate change alone could reduce dryland yields of corn, wheat, and soybeans
up to eighty percent.
On the other hand higher carbon dioxide concentrations on their own
may increase plant growth and water use efficiency. When the combined
effects of climate and CO2 are considered, results depend on the severity of
climatic change. The situation is better or worse depending on how much
hotter it will get. In general, global wanning will increase the relative
productivity of the northern areas, while decreasing productivity in the
southern areas. Consequently, there is an estimated increase of five to
seventeen percent of acreage in the northern Great Lakes states, the northern
Great Plains, and the Pacific Northwest as compared to a decrease of five to
twenty-five percent of acreage in Appalachia, the Southeast, and the southern
Great Plains. According to the EPAs economic models, 106 the production
capacity of United States agriculture appears adequate to meet domestic needs
even under the more extreme climate change scenarios. It must be pointed out
that such a sanguine prospect is not shared by the UNEP/ICSU/WHO study.10 7
In any event the crops will be produced in different regions, thus leading to a
redistribution of agricultural production and resources.
Forests which occupy one-third of the land area of the United States will
be significantly affected. The report envisages a reduction of the range of
streams feeding Mono Lake. This beautiful lake, lying at the eastern entrance to Yosemite
National Park, is the second largest lake in California. As a result of the diversion, the level of
the lake has dropped, the surface area has been diminished by one-third, and the principal island
of the lake that was the feeding and breeding grounds of birds, has been exposed to coyotes.
Furthermore, birds are no longer able to feed on the brine shrimp of the lake. In a landmark
decision the Supreme Court of California held that the state was under a duty to protect the
people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, and could surrender that
right of protection only in rare cases. The implications of that decision have still to be worked
out. Recently, in a more conciliatory vein, the City of Los Angeles has decided to reverse the
environmental harm it has caused by taking less water from Mono Lake and the Owens Valley.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1989, at A9, col. 1. By deciding not to take as much water from Mono
Lake and the Owens Valley, the City of Los Angeles has also made a decision to obtain the water
from elsewhere. This must necessarily involve claims to water used for agricultural purposes.
A move that will be strongly resisted by the subsidized agricultural water users in California. Id.
102. This would arise from (a) less water available to dilute pollutants; (b) enhanced
thermal stratification of lakes leading to increased algal production; and (c) runoff and leaching
of land caused by increased irrigation. UNITED STATES CLIMATIC CHANGE, supra note 80, at
20.
103. Wirth, Climate Chaos, 74 FOREIGN POL'Y 3, 11 (1989).
104. Id. The United States pre-eminence in world affairs is largely due to its economic
strength. For this reason, the United States has a large investment in the status quo, and has
more at stake in the global climate battle. Id.
105. UNITED STATES CIMATIC CHANGE, supra note 80, at 21.
106. Id. at 22. However, see UNEP/ICSU/WHO REPORT, supra note 17.
107. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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hemlock and sugar maple in the eastern United States. 108 Moreover, climate
changes may cause major changes in forest composition and significant
reductions in the land area of healthy forest,109 with such reductions being
visible from 30 to 80 years hence."(0 In addressing biodiversity, 1 the EPA
report suggests that climatic changes will lead to the extinction of many species
just as the ice age did. Like trees, plants and animals may have difficulty in
migrating with a rapidly changing climate or adapting to it. The diversity of
life found in wetlands will be endangered by the advancing sea.
Air quality is also directly affected by temperature, precipitation
patterns, and global circulation. Global temperature increases will increase
manmade and natural emissions of hydrocarbons, manmade emissions of sulfur
and nitrogen oxides. Temperature increases will speed the chemical reaction
among chemicals in the atmosphere, and cause ozone pollution in many areas.
The EPA report suggests that long term strategies to reduce ozone and acid rain
levels may need to factor in global climate change.112 Global warming may
also lead to increases in morbidity and mortality, particularly for the elderly
during the summers.113
What emerges is a scenario in which global climatic changes will have a
major impact on natural ecosystems. Ecological damage will be very serious.
Forests, wetlands, barrier islands and national parks could be severely, even
irreversibly, damaged." 4 Apart from impacts on the forest industry, forests
provide habitat for animal life. Wetlands are the feeding and breeding ground
of fish and other species. Climatic changes will also affect when, where, and
how we farm; the availability of water to drink and water to run our factories;
how to live in our cities; how we use our beaches for recreation; and how all
levels of government and industry function.115
C. How Acceptable are the Effects?
1. Risk Assesment
It is clear that the effects of global warming will primarily affect
ecology, agriculture, forestry and human habitat. Effects on human health and
mortality are relatively small. To what extent should we take steps to protect
ourselves against these risks? Here that we encounter the science of risk
108. Climatic changes could move the southern and northern boundary by 400 miles.
Since forests have only migrated sixty miles per century the actual range of forests is likely to be
reduced. UNITED STATES CLIMATIC CHANGE, supra note 80, at 9.
109. Higher temperatures may reduce soil moisture levels. Trees that need wetter soils
may die. In central Michigan, forests now dominated by sugar maple and oak may be replaced
by grasslands. Id. at 11. See Shugart, Antonovsky, Jarvis & Sandford, CO2, Climatic Change
and Forest Ecosystems, in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 17, at 475-512.
110. It has to be remembered in this context that apart from climatic changes, the
continued depletion of stratospheric ozone, the presence of tropospheric ozone and the acid
deposition will also have their toll on forests. UNITED STATES CLIMATIC CHANGE, supra note
80, at 11.
111. Biological diversity can be defined as the variety of species in ecosystems and
genetic variability within each species. Id. at 13. See OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 27,
at 147-54.
112. UNITED STATES CLIMATIC CHANGE, supra note 80, at 30.
113. Id. at 32.
114. See Unfinished Business, supra note 6, at 48 (Table 2-4).
115. UNITED STATES CLIMATIC CHANGE, supra note 80, at 7.
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assessment and risk management. 116 Although usually employed in the field of
hazardous chemicals these methodologies are applicable to the risks associated
with global warming.
The emergence of risk analysis in environmental regulation appears to be
a classic paradigm formation as described by Kuhn. 117 With "risk" as the
organizing concept and risk assessment as the format for elaboration on it, risk
analysis provides an "implicit body of intertwined theoretical and
methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation and criticism" in a field
where choices need to be made and action prioritized.n8 This article argues
that limiting the criteria for assessing the acceptability of risk to statistical risk
or harm to human health is unacceptable. Such criteria must be enlarged to
include the public perception of risk together with harm to nature and
ecological systems.
Statistical risks are usually based on technical estimates of fatalities. Risk
assessors assume that public perception of risk (or perceived risk) that does not
accord with the statistical mortality rates (statistical risk) is irrational. This is
simply untrue. The public perception of risk (perceived risk) is based upon
competing or alternate rationalities, embracing a richer more complex version
of risk, that are as cogent and persuasive as those of the risk analyst. 119
Furthermore, risk assessment by and large focuses upon harm to human
health and diminishes the damage caused to nature, ecological systems, welfare,
and intangible or non-utilitarian values. 120 Consequently, global warming,
which constitutes the greatest of the known threats to nature and ecological
systems, 121 but does not present a great risk to human health, 122 may well be
glossed over as unimportant. Where nature is given its rightful place in
environmental protection, however, risk assessment cannot be confined to
health risks alone.
116. Risk analysis, which emerged in the 1970's, employs engineering and natural
science methodologies in order to measure, predict, and manage events that are presumed to
have physical and biological causes. The natural science basis of scientific risk analysis
distinguished it from actuarial, economic, or financial risk analysis. In the 1970's, the physical,
engineering and biological scientists engaged in this field thought they were studying bio-
physical reality, or "real risks" that was amenable to objective findings, in contrast to the old
actuarial risk analysts who were studying non-natural phenomena. Starr, Rudman & Whipple,
Philosophical Basisfor Risk Analysis, 1976 ANN. REV. ENERGY 640-42; see also W. ROWE,
AN ANATOMY OF RISK (1977); Wilson & Crouch, Risk Assessment and Comparison: An
Introduction, 236 SCI. 267 (1987). Risk assessment as presently practised assumes that risk is
an omnipresent, mathematically measurable possibility of harm that applies to natural events as
well as human actions. "Because the probabilistic concept identifies risk by measuring the
probability and value of events, rather than by examining analogies to pradigm cases, risk can be
seen as reality that yields its secrets to scientific enquiry." Thompson, Risk Objectivism and
Risk Subjectivism: When are Risks Real? 1 RISK 6 (1990).
117. T.S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 15-22 (1962).
118. Id. Lyndon, Risk Assessment, Risk Communication and Legitimacy: An
Introduction to the Symposium, 14 COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 89, 90 (1989).
119. See infra Part 2 text accompanying notes 137-42.
120. UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 6, at 5-7. Ecological effects are defined as
effects on natural ecosystems caused by habitat modification and environmental pollution on the
fauna and flora of aquatic, and terrestrial environment systems. Welfare effects include damage
to agriculture, forestry and fisheries, recreation, and buildings to which a monetary value can
often be assigned.
121. Id. at 48, 55.
122. Id. at 34, 42.
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While this article does not propose either to embark on a comprehensive
exposition of the organizing concept of risk or of the methodologies employed
in risk assessment, a sketch of their main features becomes necessary. Such a
broad picture is essential to understanding the criticisms levelled against the
uncritical acceptance of risk assessment as a method of answering the vital
question of what steps should be taken to protect ourselves against the risks of
global warming.
The underlying rationale for risk evaluation is both compelling and
convincing. Risk of one kind or another is endemic to our situation. These
risks are the inevitable consequence of the standard and quality of living we
desire. All these risks cannot be eradicated. For example, to close down a
electric company because it is unable to meet clean air standards, despite its best
efforts, might give cleaner air but would result in much greater risks to health
and safety.123 A risk free environment is simply a chimera. In deciding which
risks to eliminate or reduce there clearly is a need for prioritization. Given the
limited resources available for the task we need to find out more about the
nature of the risk we face and then decide how much of an unacceptable risk
should be reduced.
In the face of pervasive and ubiquitous risks of all kinds, the effects of
which are typically ringed with some uncertainty, the EPA envisions risk
reduction becoming a common objective and measure of all agency action. 24
The risk management approach has two major ends: setting priorities among
the risks presented by pollution and choosing the appropriate reduction actions
for the risks so selected. 125 In the case of priority setting, risk management
would enable the agency as a whole to direct its energies against the worst set of
risks susceptible to its control. It is important that the EPA define its priorities.
Despite the differences in approach of its mandating statutes, "EPA
programs are part of a single national effort embodied in a single Agency. The
Agency in turn must respond to a basic requirement of good public policy: to
establish the connection between some expenditure and some recognized public
good."'126 Agency management needs to know if the resources of the EPA are
being directed at the right targets. While the Agency must enforce the statutes
as presently written, it needs to select the set of actions that most efficiently
reduces environmental risk as a whole.'27 Although advanced in the context of
existing environmental regulation, the principles advocated by EPA are clearly
applicable to policy decisions about a new risk such as global warming.
The next step lies in applying risk management. In its influential report
the National Research Council (NRC) suggested that risk evaluation embraces
two distinct and different exercises: risk assessment and risk management. 28
The NRC perceived risk assessment as a use of the factual base to define the
123. Justice Powell, in Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 272 (1976), noted
that "[t]he shutdown of an urban areas electrical system could have even more serious impact on
the health of the public than that created by a decline in ambient air quality."
124. 15th REPORT, supra note 71, at 226.
125. Id. at 227.
126. Id. at 231.
127. Id. at 227. 'This is a difficult task, but it can be done. Indeed it must be done if
one of the primary purposes of EPA's existence is to be achieved - the development of a
coherent environmental program out of an array of disparate legislative mandates."
128. RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 64.
244 [Vol. 32
1990] GLOBAL WARMING 245
health effects of exposure of individuals or populations to hazardous material
and situations. In contrast, risk management was seen as the process of
weighing policy alternatives and arriving at policy decisions. 129
Professional risk analysts, undertaking risk assessments, aspire to be
objective. In doing so, risk analysts try to focus on the consequences of each
risk and then on the objectively comparable features of those consequences. 30
Risk analysts are thus under constant pressure to reduce the many dimensions of
each problem to some common measure in terms of which objective
comparison seems possible.' 31 They find the objective basis for their
assessments in statistics dealing with mortality arising from risk. The statistics
they use refer to technical estimates of human mortality or "body counts." 132
When experts assess a risk, "they are most concerned with how many people
will die from it in an average year."133 In accordance with such a view it has
been argued that it is irrational to fear nuclear power plants, air transport in
jumbo jets, chemical additives, and contaminants in food or recombinant-DNA
technology because they are less dangerous than cottage industries, wood stoves,
transportation by car, or exposure to natural toxins or pathogens.' 34
Experts defending such a quantitative approach concede not only that it is
systematically and unquestionably biased toward the quantifiable aspects of a
decisions, but also that some costs and benefits tend to be ignored because they
are more difficult to measure than others.135 According to critics of
quantitative risk assessment the admission is damning as what is left out
altogether might be crucial to a properly informed decision. Others see risk
assessment reducing entire problems to terms misstating their underlying
structure in order that they may be quantified. 136
2. Public Perception of Risks
The views of expert risk analysts137 are often at variance, sometimes
fundamentally so, with the public's perception of risk. For lay people and the
public, riskiness means more that the expected number of fatalities. 138 While
129. Id. at 3.
130. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 84 (1972).
131. Tribe, Ways Not To Think Of Plastic Trees, 83 YALE LJ. 1315, 1319 (1973).
Tribe refers to policy analysts of whom risk analysts are a species.
132. Gillette & Krier, supra note 61, at 1072.
133. Allman, Staying Alive in the 20th Century, 85 SC. 31, 35 (1985), cited by Gillette
& Krier, supra note 61, at 1073. See also Gillette & Krier, supra note 61, at 1072, where the
authors state: "So, for example, when technical experts are asked to rank the risks of various
activities and technologies their responses correlate highly with technical estimates of annual
fatalities. When experts write about relative risk, they implicitly or explicitly use body counting
as the relevant measure.... In the view of the experts, then, risk is a one-dimensional
phenomenon ......
134. Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in
the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277,278 (1985).
135. Leonard & Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risk: Its Philosophy and
Legitimacy, in VALUES AT RISK 31, 43 (D. Maclean ed. 1986).
136. Tribe, supra note 130, at 96-97.
137. Most risk experts presume that societal or public risk aversion is a linear function
of the average annual probability of fatality associated with a hazard. K. FRECHETTE, RISK
ANALYSIS AND SCIENTIFc METHOD (1985) (see especially chs. 1, 2 & 6).
138. Slovic, Fischloff & Lichtenstein, Regulation of Risk, A Psychological Perspective,
in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 270 (R. Noll ed. 1985) [hereinafter
Slovic].
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fatality is a important factor, the public's perception of risk is related to other
factors such as the catastrophic potential, the threat to future generations and
the "dread factor." Increases in an activity's dread factor, intensify its
perceived risk. This higher risk perception results in more people wanting the
risk reduced, together with a greater willingness to employ strict regulation to
achieve the desired reduction in risk. 139
Unfortunately, risk assessment does not take account of these qualitative
and psychological perceptions of risk. This article adopts the cogently argued
conclusion that the public's richer and fuller multidimensional view of risk is
fully justifiable on competing and equally valid rationales. 140 Attempts to
characterize, compare and regulate risks therefore, must be sensitive to this
broader concept of risk.141
In global warming the statistical risk of mortality is small. Consequently,
competing rationales for assessing risk become of special importance.
Conversely, the qualitative fear of interfering with climate is very strong.
There is a dread, amounting at times to a taboo, about interfering with the
primordial and elemental forces of nature that shape climate. The thought of
interfering with these mighty, perhaps almighty, forces that cause the rain to
fall and the sun to shine bring dread and trembling to the minds of ordinary
people. We stand in awe and fear of a climatic balance which has evolved
through the ages to give us the stability of a habitable earth. To interfere with
this fragile equilibrium, to destroy something which we cannot create,
something which is the expression of millennia of evolution, is to meddle with
the unknown. The consequences might be irreversible and horrendous.
Apart from the dread of unseen forces that might be released by global
warming, rises in sea level also engenders fear and dread. The ordinary public
associates rising seas with disaster. When Christ warned of the last days it was
in terms of rising seas. 142 Whatever the reality of dikes and levees, the
common imagination does not perceive the rising sea as containable or
arrestable.
3. Protecting Nature
The consequences of global warming, as we have noticed, are primarily
ecological. We are dealing with a phenomenon that will largely affect life
support systems rather than mortality. This creates particular problems for the
risk analysts who have concentrated on risks to human health and seem
impervious to risks that are posed to nature and ecological systems.
Risk analysts do not currently possess a generally applicable methodology
for evaluating ecological risk.143 Yet genetic diversity and the ecological
integrity of forests, wetlands and agriculture are threatened by global warming.
Risk analysis founders in the face of laws that not only seek to enhance the
environment's economic utility but also seek to identify and preserve the
intrinsic natural qualities of ecosystems.
139. Id. at 263-65.
140. Gillette & Krier, supra note 61, at 1071-76.
141. Slovic, supra note 138, at 270.
142. Luke 21:25.
143. Unfinished Business, supra note 7, at 43.
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In these laws we encounter a clear intention to preserve nature for its
own sake and not because of its market value. For example, NEPA clearly
requires consideration of adverse environmental effects on natural areas, and
the preservation of the "natural aspects of our national heritage." 1" Among the
goals of the Clean Water Act are the attainment of water quality "which
provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife."'145
The Clean Air Act contains provisions protecting parks and wilderness areas.' 46
The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 commits the
nation to preserve the "health of the oceans."'' 47 The Endangered Species Act
of 1973 finds that various fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States are in
danger of extinction, and seeks to provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered species depend may be conserved.148 The Act pledges
that the United States, as a sovereign state in the international community, will
conserve to the extefit practicable various species of fish, wildlife and plants
facing extinction. 149 The United States Supreme Court has held that section 7
of the Endangered Species Act admitted of no exceptions and required all
federal agencies and departments to insure that actions authorized, funded, and
carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species.150
3(i). Utilitarian Rationales
This article does not propose to analyze the competing theories
underlying the need to protect nature except to identify three broad rationales
under which the protection of nature could be subsumed.' 5 ' The first is a
utilitarian or anthropocentric rationale. 52 It argues that nature should be
protected because it is in the self interest of men and women to do so.
144. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.§ 4331(b)(4) (1982).
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1985).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 7470(c).
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982).
148. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) & (b).
149. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (a)(4) (Supp. 1989).
150. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978). Following the
outcome in Hill, Congress amended the Act in 1978 to include procedure for exempting agency
actions, in some situations, from rigid compliance. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (e)-(p) (1985).
151. For a captivating introduction to the debate on how to value nature see Ashby, The
Search for an Envirownental Ethic, in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 1-47
(S.M. McMurrin ed. 1980); see also Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal
Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); Meyers, An Introduction to
Environmental Thought: Some Sources Some Criticisms, 80 IND. L. REV. 426 (1975). A
distillation of the arguments, and his own rationale that the "transformative values" of nature
offers a basis for its protections is offered by B. NORTON, WHY PRESERVE NATURAL
VARIETY (1987). An illuminating and comprehensive survey together with an excellent
analysis, the most definitive to date, is found in R. NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE (1989).
152. Utilitarian is being treated here as broadly synonymous with that which is of value
to humans, or contributes to human happiness, pleasure or some other substantive good. It is
recognized that utilitarianism is a broad church which subscribes to a wide cluster of positions
sharing a hedonistic theory of value and a consequentialist method of evaluating courses of
action. This means that utilitarianism judges the value of actions according to the degree to
which their consequences increase or decrease happiness, pleasure, value, or some other
substantive good. M. SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OFTHE EARTH 105 (1988). The wide range of
thinking encompassed by utilitarianism might make it too vague and inexact for more precise
analysis. B. NORTON, supra note 151, at 7. The term does, however, serve our purposes of
identifying and distinguishing broad approaches to the problems we address. See, C. STONE,
EARTH AND OTHER ETMCS 115-16 (1987).
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Consequently, to undertake species extinction is unwise because "[e]ach species
provides a service to the environment; each species is a part of an immensely
complicated ecological organization, the stability of which rests on the health of
its components."153
Global wanning will destroy forests, coastal and estuarine areas,
together with the ecosystems they support. The effect of such destruction is
that the whole planet's evolutionary heritage - its genetic diversity - will be
put in jeopardy. Matthews accurately pointed out that the only reason species
loss is not a front page issue is that the majority of species have not yet been
discovered. The few conservation biologists who can even guess at the number
of species that are vanishing think that twenty percent of all the species now
living will be extinct by the year 2000 - without global warming.154
Global warming will dramatically increase this figure. The losses could
be economically devastating. Genetic resources are an important source of
materials for energy and construction, chemicals for pharmaceuticals and
industry, vehicles for health and safety testing, and natural pest controls. Once
they are lost, they will be lost forever. Ironically, these resources will be lost
at the very moment when biotechnology makes it possible to exploit them for
the first time.155 To assume that we could do without them is to make one
massive false negative that could have devastating consequences. Increases in
the global rate of extinction increases the vulnerability of the human species to
extinction.1 56 Accordingly, human self interest is served by preserving
ecological systems and their functioning parts. 57
Additionally, ecosystems support natural resources such as fish. If they
are destroyed humans will lose a vital source of food. For example, there is a
material exchange between salt marshes and coastal waters. The outwellings of
nutrients and organic detritus from salt marshes feed large areas of adjacent
waters such as estuaries. This enrichment of estuaries helps to support an
abundance of animal life and serve as the feeding and breeding ground of fish
and bird life.' 58 A destruction of salt marshes will, therefore, have painful
economic consequences. This article's Introduction suggested that the
destruction of species constitutes a threat to the life support systems on which
we depend. Such an argument is squarely based upon utilitarian reasoning.
3(ii). Altruistic Rationales
Other arguments offer an altruistic and non-utilitarian rationale for
protecting nature. A variety of altruistic theories seek to establish reasons for
153. 119 CONG. REC. S25,668 (1973), remarks of Sen. Tunney arguing for the
Endangered Species AcL
154. Mathews, supra note 1, at 165.
155. Id.
156. P. EHRLICH & A. ERLICH, ExTINCTION: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES (1981). The authors preface their book with a parable called
the "Rivet Poppers." A person enters an airplane for a flight but notices a workman prying
rivets out of the wings. When questioned the workman explains that the rivets can be sold for
two dollars each, thus reducing the price of flying. Asked about the safety of the practice the
workman replies that it must be safe as it has been going on for a some time and no wings have
yet fallen off even after successive rounds of rivet popping. Id. at xi-xiv.
157. M. SAGOFF, ECOLOGY AND THE LAW 9-10 (1987) (Criticizing such a view as
being without adequate scientific foundation). See also B. NORTON, supra note 151, at 73-97.
158. M. SAGOFF, supra note 152, at 6-9, citing such a view in order to criticize it.
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protecting nature independent and apart from self interest and utilitarianism.
These rationales are based upon deontological theories positing in essence, that
nature is to be protected because we have an obligation - an ethical duty
beyond self - to do so.159 Professor Tribe, for example, argues that "[w]e can
be truly free to pursue our ends only if we act out of obligation, the seeming
antithesis of freedom."'16 To be free is to choose what we shall be. In doing
so, we must be able to reason about what to choose and to choose in terms of
commitments we have made to bodies of principle that we perceive as external
to our choices and by which we feel bound. "Individually or communally
defined human interests may often be at odds with the primal ethical impulse -
the sense of duty beyond self - that gives passion and impulse to many who see
elements of the inviolable in nature." In such a situation, the ethical duty
beyond self becomes the sense of obligation offering a rationale for protecting
nature. 161
Sagoff, though disagreeing with Tribe on his formulation of a nature
centered rationale, belongs to the same altruistic, though anthropocentric,
tradition. He argues that "[w]e value the health and integrity of natural
ecosystems because they command our love and admiration."1 62 "Love,
reverence and respect are human values but they do not necessarily involve
human welfare. Rather, these human values maybe directed to the well being
and integrity of the rest of nature."163 What distinguishes these values from
utilitarianism is that they are directed toward the good of nature and not the
good of humans. Accordingly, wild mountain valleys, bays and marshes are
valued for their spiritual, cultural and aesthetic worth.16
In his celebrated Theory of Justice, John Rawls explained how
contractual arrangements may have occurred at the beginning of any society.
Rawls further envisioned that a group of people could draw up what would be
acceptable principles of justice and equality provided they worked behind a veil
of ignorance unaware of the status and position they would themselves hold in
the society to be governed by those principles.16S Tribe has proposed adding
nature to the contractual arrangements between people. A morally evolving
and expanding concept of community, that has included blacks and women, is
beginning to incorporate animals, plants, and perhaps canyons, mountains and
seashore. In such a situation, Rawls' principle of maximum liberty (which
applied equally to all members of the community) would maximize the benefits
for all life not merely human life.166
159. Stone, supra note 151, at 115-16; B. NORTON, supra note 151, at 7-8; M.
SAGOFF, supra note 152, at 155-65.
160. Tribe, supra note 131, at 1326.
161. Id. at 1331.
162. M. SAGOFF, supra note 157, at 5.
163. M. SAGOFF, supra note 152, at 148.
164. Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 Yale LJ. 205, 221-22, 265
(1974).
165. J. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JusTIcE 60-65, 136-38 (1971).
166. Tribe, supra note 131, revised in WHEN VALUES CONFLICT: ESSAYS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS, DISCOURSE AND DECISIONS 61-91 (L. Tribe, C. Schelling, J.
Voss eds. 1976).
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In similar vein Eric Ashby creatively suggests that what happens behind
John Rawls's veil of ignorance could be applied to the environment.167 In
arriving at a consensus the people would be considering not only their
individual self-interests but also the good of the group or community in which
they would live. Behind such a veil of ignorance they might well consider
Sagoff's problem of the decline of rockfish in Chesapeake Bay caused by
pollution. 168 If the rationale for environmental protection is purely utilitarian a
possible answer could take the form of converting the Bay into a factory farm
for rockfish. If the land could be developed for agriculture, then so could the
sea. For example, the the Bay could be divided by concrete weirs into neat
aquacultural plots. Ecologists could write computer programs to manage the
production of crabs, oysters and other finer foods for which there is a market.
Genetic engineers might create a new species by recombining genes or they
may culture edible tissues in vitro. While this was happening the main channel
of the Bay could be utilized efficiently as a sewer and liquid highway. 6 9
On the other hand it is equally rational, and more probable, for the
decision makers behind the veil of ignorance to arrive at conclusions that seek
to preserve the "health" and "integrity" of the Bay, simply because they believe
that natural resources should be protected because of cultural, aesthetic and
spiritual values independent of human health or consumer demand. According
to Mark Sagoff an estuary like Chesapeake Bay may be seen by those who
depend on it as a way of life, and viewed as part of a long and proud cultural
and historical heritage that should be protected.170
Such an argument resonates in international law. Christopher Stone
reports that the environmental protection given to the Antarctic by the parties
to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 was not intended to keep the Antarctic
preserved so that it could be enjoyed by others. What the negotiants all felt was
an awe for the region, "for the fact that of the entire earth, nothing on that
scale had remained as little touched by human intervention."171
3(iii). Nature Centered Rationales
Finally, other environmentalists, appalled by the human destruction of
nature and habitat have attributed intrinsic value to non-human species, arguing
that however useful they are for human purposes, their full value is not
exhausted by instrumental values. Nature has a right to exist wholly apart from
humankind. 72 The value of nature results from qualities it possesses rather
167. Ashby, supra note 151, at 32. Ashby invites us to substitute "environment" forjustice and equality. He argues that environmental policies are indeed made under a veil of
ignorance and that those making policies are displaying welcome prudence. What is being
addressed in the text is not the substitution but the addition of environment to other deontological
theories.
168. M. SAGOFF, supra note 157, at 4-6.
169. Id. at 5.
170. Id. at 12.
171. C. STONE, supra note 152, at 95-96. He cites his student Professor Steve Burton.
However, see Burton, New Stresses on the Antarctic Treaty: Toward International Legal
Institutions Governing Antarctic Resources, 65 VA. L. REV. 421, 432 n.67 (1979), where
Burton suggests that Sagoff's thesis could be extended to international environmental problems
only with considerable attenuation.
172. "The other beings ... havejust as much right to be in that place as we do, they arc
their own justification for being, they have inherent value, value completely apart from whatever
worth they have for humans." David Foreman quoted in R. NASH, supra note 151, at 4. This
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than its usefulness in serving values external to it. These "biocentric"
philosophers assume that all forms of life, including plants and animals, possess
inherently equal value.173 Proponents of biocentricism see a natural
progression from the freeing of slaves, to the granting of voting rights to
women, to the eventual recognition of the rights of nature. 174 This view runs
counter to the methods that assess the worth of objects on the basis of their
demand value, or their aesthetic, cultural or spiritual value to humans.
Regardless of the exact rationale underlying the protection of nature,
there is little doubt that risk assessment, as presently practiced, does not give
nature its rightful place in the evaluation of environmental risks. Any
assessment of the effects of global warming, therefore, must give full weight to
the awesome impact it will have on nature.
4. Should We Address Effects Rather Than Causes?
Apparently, influential voices in the Bush Administration argue that the
United States should address the effects of global warming rather than its
causes. 175 In their view, even if global warning is proved to be caused by the
burning of fossil fuels, seeking emission limits on carbon dioxide will be too
costly in socioeconomic terms. 76 They argue that it is more sensible and
prudent to counter the effects of global warning rather than the causes.
A State Department position paper prepared for a meeting of the
International Panel on Climate Change, resisted an attempt by some nations to
impose limits on carbon dioxide.177 The argument appears to be that the costs
of emission limitations on carbon dioxide emissions will be too costly.
Accordingly, any steps against global warming should not aim at "protecting
the climate, per se." Rather, the objective should be "to protect social,
environmental and economic well-being from the adverse effects likely to result
from global climatic change." 78
This line of argument suggests that we can, for example, build sea walls
and levees against the rising sea thereby protecting centers of population, and
design different irrigation and crop procedures adaptable to warmer climates.
Presumably we can exist without the forests and species that will be
is a philosophical trend which emerged in the 1970's. Feinberg has cogently argued that plants
and species could not possess rights essentially because they lacked "cognitive capacity." They
are unaware of their treatment and could not, therefore, have an interest in not being harmed.
Without the capacity to assert interests or benefits, nature could not possess rights. Feinberg,
Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in PHILOSOPHY AND ENvIRONMENTAL CRISIS
47-51 (,V. Blackstone ed. 1974). Legal philosophers played a key role in refuting such an
argument, and making the case that inanimate objects, which are unaware of their treatment
because they lack "cognitive equipment" may still possess rights. See Morris, The Rights and
Duties of Beasts and Trees: A Law Teacher's Essay for Landscape Architects, 17 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 185, 189-91 (1964); Murphy, Has Nature Any Right to Life? 22 HASTINGS LJ. 467
(1971). The most celebrated of these efforts is, of course, Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?
Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CALIF. L. REV. 450 (1972).
173. P. TAYLOR, RESPEC FOR NATURE (1986).
174. R. NASH, supra note 151, at 6-7.
175. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1989, at 7, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1989, at 7, cols. 1-
3; N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1989, at 11, cols. 1-3; N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, at 13, cols. 1-3;
Chicago Trib., Oct. 1, 1989, at 5, cols. 1-3.
176. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1989, at 7, col. 1.
177. Chicago Trib., Oct. 2, 1989, § 1, at 5.
178. Id.
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irretrievably lost by addressing effects rather than causes. This position is
fundamentally flawed for four major reasons.
The first is ethical 179 and has two facets to it. A number of poorer
nations obviously cannot afford the cost of these measures. The assumption,
therefore, is that entire areas of land such as the Maldive Islands, together with
the most fertile food producing areas in the third world, like the Nile delta and
parts of Bangladesh, should be surrendered to an advancing sea. The cost in
human life and starvation would be tremendous. 180
It could also be argued that the effects addressing approach is unethical in
terms of the toll it would exact on animal life as well as human life. 8 1 As
noted earlier, this argument has three strands. 182 Two of these, the altruistic
and biocentric rationales, claim that it is wrong to harm nature. We have seen
how an altruistic rationale for protecting nature has given an unprecedented
moral dimension to the utilitarian arguments for conservation.18 3 Human
values of love and reverence are directed toward nature as opposed to the well
being of humans. We also noted that some attach intrinsic value to nature, thus
recognizing nature's right to exist. On either of these premises the destruction
of nature and ecological systems that will be caused by the building of sea walls
is ethically wrong.
The second argument is economic. The effects of global warming on
agriculture and the possible depletion of natural resources has already been
reviewed. The effects addressing solution assumes a "best case" scenario that
assumes temperature rises of little more than one or two degrees centigrade.
Higher temperatures would cause economic dislocations that would far
outweigh the cost of addressing global warming at its source.
The third reason impairing the effects solution lies in the destruction it
will cause to cultural heritage and inheritance. The world is gradually
becoming alive to its duties as posterity's trustee of a common and indivisible
architectural and cultural heritage. 84 It would, however, be folly to believe
that debt ridden third world countries will have the resources to indulge in
projects to preserve historic sites from rising sea levels. A relatively modest
effort to save the temples and tombs of ancient Nubia entailed an international
effort from 1949-1967 costing over $40 million. 85 This type of project would
179. Ethics is used here to refer to morality or the science of ethics. THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, vol. V (2d. ed. 1989). Hence the ensuing discussion involves the
rightness or wrongness of the effects addressing solution advocated by the State Department
insofar as it would affect human and animal life.
180. The cost of relocating entire populations is well documented. See generally A.
ZOLBERG, A. SUHRKE & S. AGUAYO, ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND THE
REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (1989), for a discussion of the refugee problem
in the third world. Refugees from armed conflicts often end up in as diseased and violent an
environment as the one from which they escaped. International relief efforts are just unable to
meet this fearful challenge.
181. See supra notes 152-55.
182. See supra notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 159-71 and accompanying text.
184. For a stiking and costly example of an international effort to preserve a cultural
legacy in Nubia-the gateway to Africa-that would have been lost when the Aswan dam was
completed see TEMPLES AND TOMBS OF ANCIENT NUBIA (Torgy Save-S6derberg ed. 1987).
185. Id. at 104. Originally the Nubian temples of Abu Simbel were situated a few
meters above the Nile River. The construction of the High Dam at Aswan meant, however, that
the water level of the Nile was going to rise year by year from 1964 onward.
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be simply impossible for the scores of sites found in the coastal and estuarine
areas of the world.
Finally, building concrete structures against an invading sea will afford
temporary relief based on a best case scenario. The measures taken to contain
effects assume global warming of the kindest and mildest kind. A worst case
scenario, or even severe climatic change, is not even contemplated. Wise
decisionmaking must surely embrace a fuller concept of risk and aim at a more
permanent solution. Such a permanent solution can only arise when we address
the causes rather than the effects of climatic change.
The State Department's arguments are insupportable on ethical, economic
and cultural grounds. Moreover, they run counter to the position endorsed by
the United States at the Paris Communique 86 and affined by President Bush at
the United Nations.18 7 The position of the State Department should be
abandoned and repudiated, and those of the Paris Communique and climatic
billsl'8 restored.
HI. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
A. The Need for Integration
Issues of science and science policy concern only one aspect of global
warming. We must also address the problem within a more overtly political
framework. In the past, global insecurity was posed by military threats and
armed aggression. 89 The threat to security as Lester Brown pointed out with
percipience and insight, "may now arise less from the relationship of nation to
nation and more from the relationship of man to nature."190 In light of such a
peril the demand to redefine national security to include environmental dangers
is difficult to resist.19' The security problem global warming presents cannot
be solved between two superpowers or even by the efforts of the major
industrialized countries. Safeguarding the world requires a truly global effort.
This effort must include the domain of international law.
Both the United States and the international community face a common
foe, and need to arrive at measures that can succeed against it. Recognition that
United States policy is addressing a common global problem makes it evident,
at both national and international levels, that the fashioning of common policies
between the United States and the international community of states presents an
eminently sensible and rational way of meeting the challenge. To the extent
186. Supra note 19.
187. Chicago Trib., supra note 177.
188. Supra note 19.
189. We witness the staggering collapse and death throes of an empire that is perceived
as the primary cause of insecurity. Security, has usually been viewed as the freedom from
danger posed by military threats and armed aggression. National security has, therefore, been
thought of as the capacity of the United States to thwart armed aggression by the Soviet Union
Unfortunately, even the removal of the Soviet threat, and the dismantling of the nuclear arsenals,
the cause of military insecurity, will not usher in an era of security. See also ARMS CONTROL
ASS'N, ARMs CONTROL AND NATIONAL SEcURrrY 5-15 (1989).
190. L. BROWN, HUMAN NEEDs AND THE SECURITY OF NATIONs 6 (1978).
191. The case for an extended definition of security is strengthened by the fact that the
concept was expanded in the 1970's to include international economics as it became clear that the
United States economy was no longer an independent force and was powerfully affected by
economic policies in other countries. Mathews, supra note 1, at 162.
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that it is a common problem, we must search for common answers acceptable to
all countries and capable of incorporation into both international and national
legal systems. If, therefore, the United States can pioneer strategies, policies
and laws that could be adapted by the rest of the international community, it
would in fact be providing solutions at the levels of both national and
international law. Consequently, United States environmental laws dealing with
global warming that integrate national, comparative and international
approaches, will constitute a rational and compelling legal response to a global
peril.
Hitherto environmental problems usually were experienced, detected and
interdicted within local or national boundaries. 92 National legal systems
possessed the jurisdictional power and the capacity to solve them. 193
Unfortunately, global warming cannot be solved in this way. It arises because
the atmospheric commons, shared by all nations, has been polluted by the very
nations that depend on it.194 Unilateral national legislation adopted by the
192. Such an assertion does not in any way seek to underplay the severity or the
magnitude of national problems. For example, in the United States rivers burst into flames,
water supplies were polluted, coastal zones had become despoiled by oil, and the air was badly
fouled. Millions gathered to protest such environmental depredations and violence on Earth Day
1970. N.Y. Times, April 23, 1970, at 1, col. 3. For a summary of the nationwide reporting of
these activities, and their impact even on conservative politicians and observers, see J.
WHITAKER, STRIKING A BALANCE 2-16 (1976); see also ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (ACIR), PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT: POLITICS,
POLLUTION AND FEDERAL POLICY 18 (1981).
193. In responding to the problems facing this country (supra note 192), Congress,
which had already enacted the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321
et. seq., responded with almost a dozen major environmental laws meant to protect human
health, natural systems and the environment. Such legislation included the Clean Air Act of
1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et. seq.; the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.§§ 651 et. seq., the Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.; the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 et. seq.; the Safe
Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f et. seq.; and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et. seq.
194. Although it is the most ominous among the global perils, global warming shares
many attributes of other second generation environmental problems. Wetstone, A History of the
Acid Rain Issue, in SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 163 (H. Brooks & L. Chester eds. 1987).
Examples of other second generation problems include: ozone depletion; the destruction of
genetic diversity; and the cycling of toxic chemicals through the environment. The massive
increase of CFC's has resulted in the depletion of the ozone layer. See infra text accompanying
notes 235-66.
The genetic diversity of the species inhabiting the planet has been endangered by massive
deforestation and destruction of natural habitat. Tropical forests harbor a disproportionate share
of the earth's biological diversity. Each year an area the size of Austria is being deforested from
these tropical forests. Biologists estimate that species are being lost at a rate 1,000 to 10,000
times faster than the natural rate of evolution. BIODIVERSlTY 3-18 (E. Wilson ed. 1988). As
many as twenty percent of all the species now living may disappear by the year 2000. Mathews,
supra note 1, argues that the loss will be felt aesthetically, scientifically and, above all,
economically. These genetic resources are an important source of food, materials for energy and
construction, chemicals for pharmaceuticals and industry, vehicles for health and safety testing,
natural pest controls, and dozens of other uses. "The bitter irony is that genetic diversity is
disappearing on a grand scale at the very moment when biotechnology makes it possible to
exploit fully this resource for the first time." Id at 165. See also Wolf, Avoiding a Mass
Extinction of Species, in WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, STATE OF THE WORLD 100 (1988).
The cycling of toxic chemicals through the environment has proved pandemic and
assumes the character of a global threat. There are over 5 million known chemical of which
about 60,000 to 70,000 are in use. Both conventional and toxic pollutants are cycled through
the oceans, the atmosphere, the biosphere and the geosphere. Toxic chemicals moving through
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United States, prohibiting such pollution, will not solve the problem when other
nations continue to pollute. The United States is only one (though perhaps the
most important) among 160 nation states. The problem insists on common and
concerted action at both global and national levels.
But this is no occasion to invoke, far less celebrate, existing international
law. That law possesses neither the jurisdiction and institutions, nor substantive
law and remedies, to deal with the problem. Alas, international law as well as
national laws permit the pollution of the global commons. Even in a shrinking,
interdependent world, international law is premised upon national sovereignty,
and nation states insist upon the sovereignty, supremacy and independence to
determine their own course of action. Consequently, when we confront
problems that have outstripped and outgrown the existing capacity of both
national and international legal systems, we also confront a glaring lacuna in the
law.
The legal gap referred to can only be overcome by a new generation of
United States environmental laws that seek to integrate international and
national policy and law. Integration is an elastic term encompassing a spectrum
of meanings ranging from implementation1 95 to unification. 196 For our
purposes integration is synonymous with compositeness rather than unity. It
ensures that United States law, by sharing a common core objective with
international concerns, will facilitate the adoption of international law.
Consequently, United States law will cohere with international law to form an
identifiable whole. Integration generates United States and international
lawmaking but does not call for the unification or uniformity of such laws.
Before we embark on an examination of how this lacuna might be filled by
integrating international law into United States law, it is necessary to delineate a
rudimentary theory of lawmaking.
B. Decision Making Theory
This article does not purport to offer an all embracive theory explaining
the formation and development of United States law or of international
agreements in general. Nonetheless, it is useful to offer an embryonic
conceptual framework justifying a premier United States role in controlling
global warming. The embryonic framework offered is derived from United
the environment pose a global threat because of their toxicity, persistence and bioaccumulation.
They cause death or serious illness in very low concentrations-in the low parts per billion or
parts per trillion. As they journey through oceans, the atmosphere and biosphere they leave a
trail of sometimes deadly harm that can only satisfactorily be dealt with through international
mechanisms. The international magnitude of the problem has resulted in a number of
international conventions.
195. Implementation refers to the process of bringing national laws into conformity with
international laws and standards.
196. David, The International Unification of Private Law, in IT E INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 5 (1971); see also UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, 1988. Cappelletti, Seccombe &
Weiler, Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience: A General
Introduction, in I INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW, EUROPE AND THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 12-
13 (M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe & J. Weiler eds. 1986). This work, dealing with a different
theme, refers to integration as ranging from cooperation to unification. Their reasoning about
the need for integration could be applied by analogy to global warming.
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States political theorizing and is extended to the much wider canvas of
international relations. 197
The theory of lawmaking begins by rejecting the Kafkaesque public
choice theories of democracy, legislative behavior, and regulation,198 which
have been extended by economists to international treaty making.199 The
cognate concept of game theory, 200 which is a method for studying decision
making in situations of conflict, is also rejected.
Public choice theories2ol view the democratic sphere as rotten at its core,
a domain of unprincipled avarice and brigandary, dominated by selfish, self-
seeking, single minded individuals. While it is not proposed to exhaustively
argue the case for rejecting such postulations, the bare reasons for so doing can
be asserted briefly. To begin with, it simply is not true that all human action is
egotistic and self-seeking. While self-interest does play a major role, it is not
the sole determinant of human behavior. It has been argued that altruism, like
self-interest, has a genetic evolutionary base,20 2 and there appears to be
substance in such a view. The explanation of human behavior as being altruistic
in some situations, and self-interested in others, is not based upon such theories.
Instead it is based upon the premise that all judgments and preferences cannot
be reduced to a single dimensional quantitative form.203
James Buchanan, who argues that self-interested behavior in the market
place is extended to the public domain, finds it implausible that man should
"shift his psychological and moral gears when he moves from the realm of
197. The United States with its federal form of government, and disparate interest
groups, offers a close analogy to the international system.
198. These "public choice" theorists apply economic theory to political decision making.
"The basic behavioral postulate of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an egoistic,
rational utility seeker." D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1979). Politics is understood as the
extension of the market in which everyone seeks to further their interests. In a democracy where
a majority binds a minority, "to the individual member of the effective majority, the political
process provides a means through which he may secure private gain at the expense of other
citizens." Buchanan, Politics, Policy and the Pigovian Margins, in THEORY OP PUBLIC CHOICE
174 (J. Buchanan & R. Tollison eds. 1972). Accordingly, they see the political system as
designed to serve the self defined private interests of individuals or groups who compete for
whatever serves their own self interest. Given a political system where interest groups
dominate, the legislative process becomes a microeconomic system in which actual political
choices are the result of transactions between reelection minded legislators and self seeking
interest groups. See D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979); J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK,
THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
(1957); W. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982); Landes & Posner, The
Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875 (1975);
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). For a fuller review of public
choice literature, see Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV.
873 (1987).
199. Hahn & Richards, supra note 16, at 428-29.
200. See Shubik, Game Theory and the Study of Social Behavior: An Introductory
Exposition, in GAME THEORY AND RELATED APPROACHES TO BEHAVIOR 8 (M. Shubik ed.
1964). See also P. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION (1986); M. DAVIS, GAME THEORY (revised ed. 1983).
201. For an excellent introduction see Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being and Public
Choice, 57 U. CH. L. REV. 63 (1990).
202. E. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY (1980); Campbell, On the Genetics of Altruism and
the Counter-Hedonic Components in Human Culture, 27 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 27 (1972).
203. Taylor, The Diversity of Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 129 (A. Sen &
B. Williams eds. 1982).
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organized market activity to that of organized political activity ... ."204 But
such a shift of gears or a change of decision criteria is a fact of life. It is
something we do almost automatically when extending love, charity, care or
sympathy to others. Self interest and altruism may be alternative wellsprings of
action.0 5 Human conduct is often governed by contrasting motivations. In the
result a person may have a number of values or principles which are
incommensurable with one another.
If such a view be taken, politics ceases to be the self-serving activity
portrayed by public choice theorists. Public decision making could become a
search for good or right answers. According to Frank Michelman:
[W]e must be able to imagine ourselves voting for the Endangered
Species Act - that is, committing ourselves to the principle of
sympathy, or solidarity, or immanence, or whatever principle we
think is expressed by the Act - although we would not as
individual be willing (or bet that our constituents would be willing)
to pay any measurable sums of money for the enactment of that
principle; and although no one has offered us anything in exchange
for our vote, explicitly or implicitly; and although we know well
that we may some day find our own private projects
inconvenienced or thwarted by the statute and the principle to
which we are now committing ourselves.206
This more sanguine explanation of human action is confirmed by
empirical evidence. To begin with, such evidence repudiates the public choice
view that voters largely seek their own financial benefit when they vote.207
Voter surveys reveal that perceptions of how government affects the interests
of others, rather than their own selfish interest alone, better explain voter
reactions to economic downturns. Voters who had themselves been
unemployed or seen a decline in their economic fortunes did not tend to vote
against incumbents, whereas those who thought incumbents generally
incompetent or thought the economy generally weak tended to vote against
those in office2 08 Similarly, ideology rather than utilitarian benefit predicted
how people responded to the need for a national health insurance.209 The
empirical evidence suggests that it is "simply not the case that self-interest
dominates wherever voters would rationally assume that their economic
interests can be affected, and that they 'rationally' remain essentially
uninterested in all other cases." 210
204. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 198, at 177.
205. S. KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY 231-48 (1987).
206. Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong With Rationality
Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 509-10 (1979).
207. Godek, Industry Structure and Redistribution Through Trade Restrictions, 28 J. L.
& ECON. 687, 688-93 (1985); Jarrel, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of
Deregulation, 27 J. L. & ECON. 273, 286-89 (1984).
208. Kinder & Kiewiet, Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of
Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting, 23 AM. J.
POL. SCi. 495, 521-24 (1979).
209. Sears, Lau, Tyler & Allen, Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes
and Presidential Voting, 74 AM. POL. SC. REV. 670 (1980).
210. Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
"Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 217 (1988).
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Secondly, the public choice claims that legislation is simply a series of
transactions between reelection-minded legislators and self-seeking private
interest groups remains unsubstantiated. Obviously, legislators have a strong
desire to be reelected, but this is leavened by other factors such as prestige
within the legislature and a desire to constructively contribute to policy
debates.21' The obverse contention, that the role of interest group pressure on
voting by representatives is large, is also repudiated by most empirical
studies.2 2 Massive areas of legal policy making, illustrated by the Civil Rights
legislation of the 1960's and the deregulation movement of the 1980's, seem
quite inconsistent with public choice theory. In both these cases many
representatives risked the wrath of powerful single interest groups to act on the
basis of what they felt was ideologically right.21 3
The preponderance of social and environmental legislation flies in the
face of public choice and its running companion - economic theories of
regulation. In protecting the environment legislators did not act as "rent
seekers," neither did they embrace the market model of legislation nor engage
in cost-benefit analysis. The primary objective and rationale of legislation was
not to serve reelection or conversely, as other economists suggest,214 to address
problems of competition, correct market failures, or deal with natural
monopolies. Legislation was based on moral, aesthetic, and cultural non-
market values enmeshed in broad political objectives. The promotion of
efficiency was not the primary objective of legislation.2 15
What Congress did can best be explained on the basis of a republican
theory of government which posits that legislators have both the obligation and
211. R. FENNO, Jr., CONGREssMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973); Farber & Frickey, supra
note 198, at 888-90.
212. See, e.g., Goldstein, The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection,
80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 161 (1986); Poole & Daniels, Ideology, Party, and Voting in the
United States Congress, 19S9-1980, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 373 (1985); Welch, Campaign
Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and Dairy Price Supports, 35 W. POL. Q.
478 (1982); Bernstein & Horn, Explaining House Voting on Energy Policy: Ideology and the
Conditional Effects of Party and District Economic Interests, 34 W. POL. Q. 235 (1981);
Bernstein & Anthony, The ABM Issue in the Senate, 1968-1970: The Importance of Ideology,
68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1198 (1974).
213. Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for
Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 320-22 (1988); Hovenkamp, supra note 201, at
85-89.
214. See, e.g., S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 1-35 (1982).
215. Through efficient means of realizing such objectives were clearly embraced. M.
SAGOFF, supra note 152, at 24-49. To the extent that the subjective happiness, satisfaction or
utility of people is the objective of legislation, criteria for measuring utility efficiency are
unsatisfactory. The science of welfare measurement requires a surrogate (wealth) in order to
account for the observer's inability to measure the real thing (subjective well being). But
mistaking the surrogate for the real thing, or worse, passing the surrogate for the original is a
different matter. See Hovenkamp, supra note 201, at 81-85. As Hovenkamp points out,
surrogates for utility such as those designed by Kaldor-Hicks do not provide a satisfactory
measure of such happiness. In situations where interpersonal comparisons of utility are
scientifically impossible, Kaldor-Hicks was designed as a substitute test for social utility. It
seeks to identify policies that increase the sum total of happiness. A policy is Kaldor-Hicks
efficient when those who gain from the policy can fully compensate the losers out of their gains.
See R. JUST, D. HEUTH & A. SCHMITZ, APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 34 (1982).
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the capacity to identify the public good.2 16 Such a view is irreconcilable with
"public choice." In so acting, Congress regulates to maximize the well being of
the community even though it does not maximize efficiency or wealth. Within
the republican view, legislators both discern a public interest and educate their
constituencies about the civic good. They do what is right for the body politic
and not for a particular interest group they happen to represent.217
The framework suggested by this article draws support from the dynamic
view of the policy forming process taken by political scientists such as John
Kingdon218 and James Wilson. 219 Kingdon rejects "public choice" theories of
legislation, as well as the usual political science preoccupation with pressure and
influence.22 Instead he makes excursions into the world of ideas and politics
and recognizes their importance in the form and content of legislation.
Kingdon borrows from the "garbage can" model of organizational choice,221
that views the political system as a garbage can in which "streams" exist. The
streams consist of "problem recognition," "policy proposals" and "politics.'222
He suggests that the enactment of a law requires the convergence of all three
streams, together with. the presence of an "entrepreneur" to guide its passage
through Congress.
Extrapolating Kingdon's theory to international law and to global
warming, this article argues that the streams have converged, making it a
propitious time for the enactment of new international law. 223 This analysis
offers a preliminary explanation of the evolving form and shape of laws dealing
with global warming. "Problem recognition" consists of how global warming
is perceived. The scientific evidence dictates that a serious problem exists.
There is a convincing consensus among scientists that we face a grave threat.24
Although there are doubts about the effects and the possible remedies, the
gravity of the global problem and the need to address it are not in issue either
within the United States or internationally.
216. Michelman, Foreward: Traces of Self Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986);
Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of
Local Government Legitinacy, 53 IND. LJ. 145, 149 (1977-1978); Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 29-31 (1985).
217. Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government
(unpublished manuscript forthcoming 1990).
218. J. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES 122-23 (1984).
219. Wilson has clarified why the politics of legislation and regulation cannot be
explained -by one neat model of predictive behavior based on rent seeking legislators. Wilson
divides the politics of legislation and regulation into four types: majoritarian, interest group,
client, and entrepreneurial. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 367-70 (J. Wilson ed. 1980).
220. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); R. DAHL, WHO
GOVERNS? (1963); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951); A. BENTLEY, THE
PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 260-61 (1967), T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 51 (2d ed.
1979); E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE (1960); L. MILBRATH, THE
WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS (1963); R. BAUER, L. POOL & L. DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1963); K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986).
221. Described in Cohen, March & Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of Organizational
Choice, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 17 (1972). See also supra note 10.
222. Id. at 92.
223. See infra text accompanying notes 248-65.
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"Politics" refers to the state of public opinion, which is running heavily
in favor of fast and effective environmental action to prevent global warming.
Although the framework offered in this article differs fundamentally from
those based on public choice and game theory, there can be little doubt that
domestic politics plays a substantial, perhaps dominant, role in forming and
shaping international agreements. 225 In this context, the findings of the
National Opinion Research Center are momentous. For the first time
Americans chose the environment as their number one priority for more
government spending ahead of crime and health care.226 Global warming has
become a bipartisan subject in which powerful legislators from both parties
have become involved.
The surge of international activity mirrors United States national
concerns. The behavior of states, in the face of a public threat to the entire
community of nations, could be governed by three broad options. One option
is to be a free rider: let everyone else cooperate to stem global warming and
accept the benefits without the costs. Another is true altruism: take unilateral
action even though other countries do not do so. A third option is reciprocal
altruism. Fred Hirsch characterizes it "as if" altruism: to cooperate provided
everyone does.227 The third option in the one consistent with down to earth,
practical national and international politics. All the evidence points to the
adoption of such an option. It cultivates the field for the right policy proposals.
The "policy proposals," based on the four themes discussed below, lead to
the conclusion that carbon dioxide emissions should be reduced by by twenty
percent by the year 2000. The proposals have arisen in response to the
perceived environmental crisis. The Dutch government, which will unilaterally
cut carbon dioxide emissions without a multilateral treaty, is playing a catalytic
role.228 Holland is too small a country, however, to shoulder and carry
through such an important proposal. A global entrepreneurial role can only be
played by a major international force. The United States is still the most
important global power and it is argued that the United States should take on
this mantle.
C. An Entrepreneur for International Law
United States leadership is the necessary catalyst in the formation of
effective international law controlling global warming. International law is still
at an early, even primitive, stage of development, and has not matured into a
legal system, as that term is ordinarily understood. It is unnecessary to explore
the well recognized distinctions between developed national legal systems and
the undeveloped state of international law except to point out that international
law does not possess a binding law-making agency or international legislature,
it has no law interpreting body or court with universal compulsory jurisdiction,
224. Even those approaching international agreements from a "public choice" standpoint
identify the existence of a scientific consensus as one of the key actors that could lead to an
international agreement. Hahn & Richards, supra note 16, at 421,433 (1989).
225. Hahn & Richards, supra note 16, at 422.
226. Chicago Trib., Dec. 31, 1989, § 4, at 1, cols. 1-3.
227. F. HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITs TO GROWTH 146 (1977).
228. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1989, at 11, cols. 1-3.
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and no law enforcing or policing agencies. 229 In short, there are no
international institutions, comparable to those within the United States, that can
create new laws dealing with global warming.
It is sadly true that answers to global problems emerge with excruciating
tardiness out of a primitive system of international law. Timely answers cannot
be extracted from the Byzantine mix of policies meshed within the international
social, scientific, and political milieu embraced by these problems. In
comparison to domestic law, international law making is generally very slow
and unproductive. 0 It will remain so despite what appears to be an emerging
scientific consensus on the gravity of these problems, and the expectation that
legal measures and controls must be fashioned because they are the only
rational way of averting evident danger.231
Unfortunately, legal action is based on political realities and not scientific
rationality. Harvey Brooks points out that past attempts to use international
scientific networks to influence national political decisions have had limited
success largely because of a lack of political sensitivity.3 2 Proposed measures
have to be measured by the pulse of the political process and cannot only be
taken on the basis of more scientific information or expertise. Law making is
difficult enough in the United States. 233 Those difficulties are multiplied in the
229. Consequently we have yet to witness the development of an international legal
system, as distinct from discrete rules of international law. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 77-97, 208-32 (1961); E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN (1954); Parsons, The
Law and Social Control, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY; EXPLORATORY ESSAYS (W. Evans ed.
1962).
230. It is salutary to remind ourselves that the United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference took over 15 years to negotiate a treaty. The Convention was concluded and opened
for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on December 10, 1982. See 21 INT'L L. MATS. 1261
(1982). As of May 31, 1989, it has only been ratified by 40 nations. 28 INT'L L. MATS. 792
(1989). It will enter into force 12 months after the sixtieth instrument of ratification. On
procrastination and delays in the formation of international law, see also Kay, The Impact of
African States on the United Nations, 23 INT'L ORG. 46-47 (1969); J. BUCHANAN. & G.
TULLOCH, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 95-115 (1962); Slouka, International Environmental
Controls in the Scientific Age, in LAW INSTITUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 208 (J.
Hargrove ed. 1971).
231. Harvey Brooks, an eminent writer on science policy, points out that from the
perspective of most scientists, policymakers should make the most rational choices on the basis
of the scientific evidence. "If the world is embarked on a self-destructive course, the
demonstration and clear explanation of this should suffice to convince key decisionmakers of the
folly of their ways and to lead them to change the undesirable course of events." Brooks, The
Role of International Research Institutions, in SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 145 (H. Brooks &
C. Cooper eds. 1987).
232. Id. at 151-52.
233. W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 1-36 (6th ed.
1985); D. LOCKARD, THE PERVERTED PRIORITIES OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1971); W.
ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION 1-36 (1987). The difficulties in enacting new
legislation are truly formidable. Interest groups seeking legislation need to have access either to
the executive or to subcommittees. While law and policy making may no longer be confined to
closed networks or "iron triangles" between congressional subcommittees, executive agencies
and outside clientele groups, the difficulties of breaking into the system are formidable. A bill
needs a sponsor, and getting sponsorship for the Draft Act could be problematical.
Congressmen and Senators hear a bewildering array of lobbyists and face a confusion of voices.
Even where a sponsor is found, the conservatism and caution of the legislature makes progress
very problematic. Congress is "devoted inordinately to the prevention of action... [and is] so
well equipped to stop legislation .. " D. LOCKARD, supra, at 123. And what it does not
stop, it alters. Compromise is the order of the day. Any proposal for legislation requires major
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international context. The complications of crossing from cognition to solution
are compounded by the fact that the international "legal system" is so much
weaker than a national legal system.23 4 The international community may agree
on what the environmental problems are, and even on what ought to be done
about them, but international political and legal processes hardly lends
themselves to the expeditious translation of "ought" to "is."
In this situation of cumbersome and sometimes irrational international
lawmaking the United States can make a critical contribution to the emerging
tapestry of environmental law and policy. The process of working towards the
creation of national law will equip and enable the United States to press for the
acceptance of a global convention. The intervention of the United States as a
superpower and an economic giant in favor of a treaty on global warming will
be critical if not decisive. Because the United States is, arguably, still the most
important environmental player on the global scene and its internal actions will
make a critical contribution to the speedier evolution and creation of new
international law.
The recent response to ozone depletion, which is analogous to global
warming, is instructive of the way in which the first question concerning the
likelihood or certainty of risk evoked similar answers from United States and
international lawmakers. Scientists found mounting evidence that chlorine
containing substances, more especially fully halogenated chlorofluorocarbons
(CFC's), when released into the atmosphere, slowly migrate into the
stratosphere235 and are broken down by solar radiation. The chlorine atoms so
produced catalyze a series of reactions that ultimately destroy ozone.
Authorities estimated that such a destruction of ozone would admit greater solar
UV-B radiation236 that would lead to increased basal skin cancers and
squamous-cell cancers. 237
Under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Program
(UNEP), a global framework convention for the protection of the ozone layer
- the "Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer" - was
signed in 1985.238 It was an umbrella convention containing broad obligations
lacking specificity. More specific and binding rules were to be elaborated in
and marginal compromise in caucus, in committee, on the floor, and in negotiations with the
executive. W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, supra, at 15-16.
234. There is no law-making body or international legislature, no law interpreting body
or court with universal jurisdiction, and no law enforcing body either administratively or
punitively. Consequently we have yet to witness the development of an international legal
system, as distinct from discrete rules of international law. See H. HART, supra note 229, at
77-97, 208-32; E. HOEBEL, supra note 229; Parsons, supra note 229.
235. The atmosphere is divided into the troposphere (9-16 kin), stratosphere (16-50
kin), and the mesosphere (50-80 kin).
236. Ultraviolet (UV-B) radiation has biological effects such as skin cancer, reduced
growth of crops, damage to living marine resources, and to commercially important material.
237. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Present State of
Knowledge of the Upper Atmosphere: An Assessment Report (1984), cited by Sand, The
Vienna Convention is Adopted, 27 ENV'T 19 (No. 5 1985). The United States banned the use
of non-essential CFC's as propellants in aerosol spray cans in 1976. However, they continue to
be used in air-conditioning and refrigeration systems, in the manufacture of plastics and foam,
and as cleaning solvents in the electronics industry. Report of the Senate Committee on
Commerce Science and Transportation, National Global Change Research Act of 1989, S. REP.
No. 101-40, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2.
238. Reprinted in 26 INT'L L. MATS. 1516 (1987).
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the form of protocols and technical annexes. The lack of agreement on more
concrete measures was partly attributable to the absence of scientific proof of
CFC damage. 239 Shortly after the Vienna Convention concluded, scientists
discovered a hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica,24 0 and found that there
had been a dramatic forty percent decrease of springtime ozone between 1977
and 1984. They realized that the scientific conclusions on which the Vienna
Convention relied had seriously underestimated the extent of ozone depletion.
The new scientific findings led to a burst of activity,41 led by the United States,
that culminated in the Montreal Protocol. 242 It might be pointed out ihat the
ozone hole did not conclusively prove the culpability of CFC's.U3 Be this as it
may a scientific consensus emerged, which the United States argued, warranted
international action. Such action was in fact taken. The ozone story illustrates
the importance of an entrepreneur capable of employing scientific findings to
advance international lawmaking.4
Furthermore, United States law could be adopted or could generate
similar laws in other countries. The foreign impact of United States
environmental law and policy has been formidable. The National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) revealed how environmental impact could
be ascertained and become part of the broader policy-making framework.245
The EPA demonstrated that a centralized pollution inspectorate could become a
reality, while citizen suits offered an antidote against administrative apathy.
Freedom of information opened the doors to environmental participation.246
Even the much maligned, rigorous, combative character of environmental laws
dealing with air and water pollution, are now seen as the wave of the future. 247
International law is a consensual law that arises only if nations agree to its
creation. The nations which emulate United States laws will be among the law-
makers of international law, and it would be perfectly natural for them to agree
to international law that mirrors their own preferences.
D. Justifying United States Leadership
At this point we confront the political objections that oppose a premier
United States role in integrating domestic and international law. Political
misgivings exist about the wisdom of this country taking hasty action that might
affect its economic performance, or place it at a competitive disadvantage. It is
not a satisfactory answer, to those lodging these objections, to be told that the
239. J. BRUNNEE, ACID RAIN AND OZONE LAYER DEPLETION 229, 237 (1988).
240. Stolarski, The Antarctic Ozone Hole, 258 Sci. AM. 30 (1988).
241. Doolittle, supra note 4, at 421-22 (1989).
242. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
reprinted in 26 INT'L L. MATs. 1542 (1987). The Montreal Protocol aims to reduce CFC
emissions by 1999 to fifty percent of 1986 levels.
243. In fact there was no ozone hole, only a large depletion of ozone. Stolarski, supra
note 240, at 30.
244. For further implications with regard to the role of the United States see infra note 4
and accompanying text.
245. See Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-Opening of the Environmental
Mind?, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 463, 511-36.
246. This is an impressionistic though widely shared view. For a recent expression see
Bonine, A Voice From the Wilderness, Calling Your Name, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 393-95
(1989).
247. D.VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION 27 (1986).
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United States has always led the world in protecting the environment, or that
we should demonstrate by the effectiveness of our environmental actions at
home our leading role in global environmental protection.249 Those opposing a
pioneer role do not share the assumption that this country should play a leading
role in protecting the environment, or be at the vanguard of the international
environmental movement, if doing so will affect its economic position.
Paradoxically, arguments from an ecological, as distinct from a political
perspective, are premised upon the hopelessness of remedial action by
individual nation, including the United States. Such arguments can only be
elliptically summarized. From an ecological perspective we live in an
interconnected world in which life processes display an immense unity. Where
scientific inquiry has revealed the fundamental integrity and globally
interrelated nature of the problems in issue,250 it seems logical to regulate
international environmental problems with matching global systems. Individual
or particularized responses by states make little sense because global
environmental problems should be assessed and remedied within a global
context and in a comprehensive manner.251
Some scientists argue that the absence of an infrastructure of scientific
and technological institutes, with a mandate to study global problems, has
resulted in a failure to integrate knowledge with power on behalf of global
society. 252 Those adopting such a position apparently contend that such a
scientific infrastructure may need to precede the emergence of a global political
system that can apply such knowledge without being thwarted or neutralized by
claims of national sovereignty.253
The ecological argument that individual or particular responses by states
make no sense in the absence of pre-existing global institutions must be
rejected. While pollution problems do create commonly shared burdens that
often call for collective or international answers, international or collective
solutions can only be fashioned out of individual responses emerging from
within the separate countries affected by, or contributing to, the problems.
Global warming, for example, is an international problem because the warming
of the earth is caused primarily by the accumulation of atmospheric carbon
dioxide caused by the burning of fossil fuels. The consequences of global
warming such as climatic change and sea level rises admittedly affect the entire
biosphere and demand international solutions. International solutions, however,
cannot be forged unless individual nations responsible for the increase of
248. DOE'S National Energy Plan and Global Warming, 1989: Hearing before the
Senate Comm. on Energy andNaturalResources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) (statement of
Senator Wirth).
249. Reilly, The Future of Environmental Law, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 352 (1989).
250. The interrelated consequences of various policies was powerfully illustrated in the
Club of Rome's publication THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (D. Meadows ed. 1972). See also P.
EHRmILIC, A. EHRILICH & J. HOLDREN, EcosCIENCE 730-34 (1977).
251. The apocalyptic environmental scenarios presented for example by B.
COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE (1971), and P. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB
(1968), could only be dealt with by world government. Richard Falk in his book THIS
ENDANGERED PLANET (1971) appears to argue that a world system based upon sovereign states
cannot possibly deal effectively with the problems of an endangered planet.
252. D. PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE 13 (1965).
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carbon dioxide such as the United States, member states of the European
Economic Community and the Soviet Union, agree to take national measures
within their countries to reduce CO2.
This article argues that the United States should lead in the search for
international solutions, because there is ample evidence that the community of
nations is responding to the challenge of global warming, and that a treaty
dealing with it will be signed possibly in 1992.m
In perhaps the most important public declaration on the need for a treaty
dealing with global climatic change, the Group of Seven Industrial Nations,
issued a communique stating their belief "that the conclusion of a framework or
umbrella convention on climate change to set out general principles or
guidelines is urgently required." 255 The remarkable extent of international
political and scientific consensus demanding such a convention that preceded
that communique has been observed.X6 It has arisen from scientific bodies,
nongovernmental organizations, nations, international organizations, and the
United Nations. There are a number of reasons, based upon enlightened self
interest, as to why the United States should dominate the law-making process of
the forthcoming treaty on global warming. As the largest producer of carbon
dioxide in the world, the United States has an obvious stake in a treaty that will
regulate how such releases should be controlled. In fact, any international laws
setting standards or dealing with steps to be taken to counteract global warming
will have to be implemented within the United States. It would be a clear
advantage if those areas of international law and policy were to be based on
United States law. In such a case the implementation of international law
would present no problem.
253. Brooks, The Role of International Research Institutions, in SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC
POLICY 151 (H. Brooks & C. Cooper ed. 1987). Citing such views, not to approve but to
refute them.
254. Perhaps the most significant political endorsement is found in the PARIS
COMMUNIQUE following the 1989 summit meeting of the Group of Seven. The communique
declared that there was a growing awareness of serious threats to the atmosphere that could lead
to global climatic change. It strongly advocated efforts to limit the emission of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases that threaten to induce climatic change and called for a framework or
umbrella convention to control climatic change. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 17, 1989, at 5,
col. 4. The PARIS COMMUNIQUE was the culmination of numerous earlier proclamations and
affirmations to the same effect. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATIC
CHANGE (IPCC) - a panel drawn from 30 countries including the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R.,
many Western European countries and Japan - which stated after their groundbreaking meeting
in November 1988 that "global warming is the most important environmental concern of our
day" and pledged to work toward a global warming treaty. Int'l Env't Rep. 644 (Dec. 1988);
DECLARATION OF THE HAGUE, March 11, 1989 - a group of 24 countries - describing the
dangers of global climatic change as a "vital, urgent and global" problem that jeopardized "the
most vital interests of mankind," and calling for new approaches through the development of
new principles of international law. Int'l Env't Rep. 176, 215 (Apr. 1989); EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, calling for a comprehensive community program to combat global
warming in November 1988. Int'l Env't Rep. 645 (Dec. 1988); the meeting of EEC
Environment Ministers, in June 1989, assures to combat greenhouse effect. Int'l Env't Rep.
285 (June 1989); UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM (UNEP), calling for a treaty on
global climate change as a top priority in June 1989. Int'l Env't Rep. 279 (June 1989); United
Kingdom, calling for a global climatic convention at the United Nations in May 1989. Int'l Env't
Rep. 281 (June 1989). The year 1992 has been set as the date for a framework or umbrella
treaty by UNEP. Int'l Env't Rep. 279 (June 1989).
255. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1989, at 5, col.4, 1 45.
256. See supra notes 254 and accompanying text.
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It is equally important to recognize that climatic change is also a national
problem that can seriously affect the United States. We have noted the quite
dramatic impact it could have particularly on agriculture, human habitation,
and water supply.=57 Encouragingly, a number of Bills now before Congress
undertake the urgent and compelling task of proposing United States legislation
that provides answers to global warming.258 An examination of developments
in the two spheres of United States and international law discloses convergent
streams of thinking which we shall be examining. Such a convergence gives
rise to the need for integrating United States and international environmental
law and regulation.
Existing and proposed United States legislation shows a remarkably
refreshing awareness of the need, Janus-like though not Janus faced, to look in
both directions. The Global Climate Protection Act of 1987 (Climate
Protection Act)z59 clearly recognizes the national importance of global climatic
change. The premises of the Climate Protection Act,260 and of much of the
legislation introduced in Congress, emphasize how crucial it is for United States
law to be developed in answer to global issues as well as to generate
international law.261
257. See supra notes 93-115 and accompanying text.
258. Bills now before the Senate and House include: S. 169, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) (to provide a national plan to improve scientific understanding of the earth and the effect
of changes to the earth system on climate and human well being); S. 201, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989) (to respond to global environmental degradation brought about by human activities
and to ensure that United States policies provide for the protection of the world environment); S.
324, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (to provide for energy conservation and explore policy
options that reduce energy use by two to four percent annually; use of nuclear energy and clean
coal technologies; reforestation; cut carbon dioxide emissions by 20% by year 2000 in the
United States; convening of international convention to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 20%
in year 2000 and 50% in year 2015); S. 333, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (to enact the Global
Environment Protection Act); S. 491, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (to reduce atmospheric
pollution to protect stratosphere from ozone depletion; 20% reduction of carbon dioxide
emissions by 2005 in the United States; convening of an international convention to do likewise
globally; energy research; reforestation); S. 603, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (to establish
within the Department of State, the Office of Global Warming); S. 676, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) (global atmospheric and environmental preservation); H.R. 1078, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) (to establish national policies and support, and encourage international agreements that
implement energy conservation strategies to prevent global warming); H.RJ. Res. 207, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (to establish that it is the policy of the United States to reduce
greenhouse gases).
259. 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (West Supp. 1989).
260. To help identify the effects of climate change, Congress asked the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to undertake two studies. One of the studies was to
focus on potential effects of global climate change on the United States and the other on policy
options for stabilizing climate. See supra note 32.
261. See, e.g., H.R. 1078, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) the Schneider Bill: Global
Warming Prevention Act, supra note 258, was supported by 111 cosponsors and has received
the endorsement of three dozen nongovernmental organizations including the World Wildlife
Fund, the Worldwatch Institute, Environmental Action, the Union of Concerned Scientists and
the Sierra Club. Can Congress Cool I?, 74 SIERRA 36 (July/Aug. 1989). The bill directs that
carbon dioxide in the United States should be reduced from 1988 levels by at least twenty
percent by the year 2000. H.R. 1078, supra note 258, § 3(1). At the same time the bill calls on
the United States to actively promote the establishment of an international global agreement on
the atmosphere by 1992 which shall establish goals for worldwide reduction of carbon dioxide
emissions from 1988 levels by at least 20% by the year 2000. Id. at § 3(3). It also calls for a
multilateral agreement to reduce nitrogen oxides emissions by 30% by 1998.
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President George Bush's historical proposals for amending the Clean Air
Act (the Bush Bill)262 provides an admirable opportunity for integrating United
States and international responses. The Bush Bill does not touch on global
warming but does address the international implications of acid rain,263 and
could well be extended to global warming. The provisions calling for the
reduction of carbon dioxide emissions together with other critical policies
dealing with the principles enumerated earlier could be telescoped into the Bush
Bill to provide a handsome composite environmental bill.
By taking legal action without waiting for international solutions, the
United States actually will be laying the foundation for an integrated solution
displaying "effective United States leadership in the international arena."2 64
President Bush embraced precisely such a response, promising in his first year
of office to summon at the White House a global conference on the environment
to discuss ways to control global warming, acid rain, the loss of tropical forests
and the saving of the oceans.265
E. Intersecting Areas of United States and International Policy
The underlying conclusions, and articulated purposes of the Global
Climate Protection Act of 1987 (GCPA),266 and the bills being examined by
Congress 267 emphasize that affirmative action should be taken in the United
States, and internationally to address the causes of global warming. The GCPA,
for example, after recounting that carbon dioxide and other trace gases "may be
producing a long term and substantial increase in the average temperature of
the earth . ,"268 concludes that necessary action must be identified and
implemented in time to protect the climate.269
We will now discuss four policy areas, of special importance, that
demonstrate a confluence of United States and international thinking. The
rationales underlying these policy proposals provide a powerful jurisprudential
and political foundation for United States legislation integrating United States
S. 324, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) the Wirth Bill, also calls for a 20% reduction of
carbon dioxide emissions by the year 2000 (S. 324, supra note 258, § 3(a)) while directing the
United States to convene an international conference in the United States for the purpose of
adopting a multilateral global climate protection convention (id. § 1401) no later than 1992 (id. §
1401(b)). The convention would require a 20% reduction of carbon dioxide emissions by the
year 2000. It also calls for a multilateral agreement to reduce nitrogen oxides emissions by 30%
by 1998.
Similar themes are seen in S. 201, supra note 258; S. 333, supra note 258; S. 491, supra
note 258; S. 603, supra note 258; S. 676, supra note 258; and H.R. 2984, supra note 258.
262. Embodied in H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
263. Apart from the obvious universality of the problems addressed, there is
significance in the fact that the 50% reduction of sulfur dioxide emissions will enable the United
States to comply with the Canadian call for a 50% reduction in SO2 emissions. The proposal for
a 50% reduction was formally rejected by the Reagan administration in 1982. See Wetstone,
The History of the Acid Rain Issue, in SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 173 (H. Brooks & C.
Cooper eds. 1987).
264. Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2901(6) (West
Supp. 1987).
265. Environmental Policy Statement by Presidential candidate George Bush (Erie
Metropark, Michigan, August 23, 1988).
266. 15 U.S.C. § 2901 note (West Supp. 1987).
267. See supra note 258.
268. 15 U.S.C. § 1102(1) (West Supp. 1987).
269. Id. at § 1102(4).
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and International policy. They set the scene for the transformation of United
States environmental law. These four proposals are: (1) the need for more
research into the causes and effects of global wanning; (2) the duty to posterity;
(3) the protection of nature; and (4) a re-definition of the atmosphere as a
global commons or the common heritage of mankind.
1. Research
The questions of how to minimize the sum of the costs of global warming
and the costs of avoiding global warming will require research. GCPA sets the
scene by identifying three goals of United States policy. They are: to increase
worldwide understanding of the problem; to promote more coordinated
international research efforts; and to identify ways of slowing and reducing the
concentration of greenhouse gases.270 The proposals now before Congress
build upon this foundation. They provide for development of a National Global
Change Research Plan,271 a Council on World Environmental Policy,272 and for
encouraging research on the mechanisms and effects of climate change. 273
These proposals will help to determine more carefully what steps are required.
They rightly seek to distinguish between the effects of human activities and the
results of natural change, and to coordinate the development of national and
international policies to abate, mitigate, and adapt to the impact of global
environmental change.
The bills before the Senate and the House share key objectives.274 One is
the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions by twenty percent by the year
2000.275 Another is the extraordinary consensus on the need for energy
conservation and more efficient use of energy.276 Cutting down on energy is
the perfect solution to pollution. It precludes the need for any kind of impact
assessment of new technologies which create new problems. 277 Research is
required on how this might best be done.
Where a reduction of carbon dioxide necessitates a substitute form of
energy, there is a need to consider the environmental impact of the alternatives
proposed. The EPA's policy options for reducing greenhouse gases involve the
270. Id. at § 1103(a).
271. H.R. 3332, Global Environmental Research and Policy Act of 1989, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989); see also H.R. REP. No. 394, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) accompanying
H.R. 3332 (1989).
272. S. 201, supra note 258.
273. S. 324, supra note 258.
274. This is not to suggest that they will all be enacted. Conclusions as to which
provisions of the existing bills will successfully emerge out of the legislative process as law, can
only be based upon conjecture. Any forecasting undertaken in this paper is shamelessly
dependant upon the views expressed by a number of environmental organizations such as the
Sierra Club, the Conservation Foundation, the World Resources Institute, and the World
Wildlife Fund.
275. S. 324, supra note 258, §§ 2(a)(5), 2(b), 3(a); H.R. 1078, supra note 258, §§
2(8), 3(1).
276. S. 324, supra note 258, Title III & Title V; H.R. 1078, supra note 258, Title I.
277. Somewhat perturbing, however, is the reliance placed on natural gas. See, e.g.,
H.R. 1078, supra note 258, Title VI, esp. § 701; S. 324, supra note 258, Title X. While natural
gas may not produce as much carbon dioxide, and may well prove to be the best of the bridging
fuels, until others such as solar energy or biomass come on line, it is important to determine the
environmental impact of natural gas before relying so heavily upon it.
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use of a bundle of measures.2 78 They include: a phaseout of CFC; reforestation;
improved transport efficiency; promoting natural gas; more stringent NO2 and
CO2 emission limits; solar technologies; commercialized biomass; and nuclear
power.279
In considering environmental impact the air, land and water should be
considered as one environment rather than as separate and discrete parts. Such
an approach is based on an integrated approach to pollution control.280 A
preliminary cross-media analysis reveals that some of these, like the use of
nuclear power, can present different environmental problems. For example,
nuclear power generates spent fuel and high level waste that, will remain
hazardously radioactive for many thousand years. We now realize that finding
a burial place for nuclear wastes presents an intractable problem.28' Cross-
media transfers of such wastes, e.g., ocean dumping, only shift the burden of
pollution from land to the sea. The potential for damage may be even
greater.282
Disposal in the territories of poorer countries may be considered illegal
and cannot be viewed as either ethical or just. Apart from illegality or
immorality, self-interest counsels against the disposal of radioactive wastes in
other countries where they are the sources of one's own raw material and food.
Additionally, where debtor countries are concerned, facing devastating public
health problems because of nuclear waste, would make the recovery of 'debts
extremely difficult.
Another of the options for reducing reliance on fossil fuels is greater
reliance on hydroelectric power (HEP).283 In considering such an option, the
risks of dam bursts and the severe damage this could cause should be first
considered. Second, the environmental impacts of HEP, such as the destruction
of ecosystems, uprooting of homesteads, health risks from toxic gases generated
by rotting submerged vegetation and soil, from waterborne diseases such as
schistomiasis (snail fever), and impediments caused by dams to fish migration,
should be assessed against the benefits to be derived from the reduction of
carbon dioxide. Such a consideration may lead to the conclusion that HEP is
not the most beneficial alternative to the burning of fossil fuels. Another
alternative may be nuclear power which does not possess the particular
disadvantages of REP.
The importance of cross-media pollution is being recognized within an
international context. To begin with, geographic water areas, such as the North
Sea and the Baltic in Europe and the Great Lakes in North America, reveal the
278. UNITED STATES ENVIRoNMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY OPTIONS FOR
STABILIZING GLOBAL CLIMATE (1989).
279. Id. at 34.
280. A fuller argument of the case for integrating pollution regulation is found in
Guruswamy, supra note 245, at 463.
281. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1989, at 19, cols. 1-4 and at 20, cols. 1-5. "When the
Department of Energy said last night that it had lost confidence in its latest effort to find a safe
place (a deep geologic repository in the Yucca Mountain) to bury nuclear waste, a gnawing
question re-surfaced: is the task possible?"
282. See Note, The Need for a Ban on All Radioactive Waste Disposal in the Ocean, 7
Nw. J. Int'l L. 803, 804-05, 832 (1986) (radioactive wastes are more easily contained on land
rather than in the sea).
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need for a cross-media approach to pollution control. 28 4 These areas
demonstrate the necessity to deal with all sources of pollution. In fact, there is
at least implicit recognition of the air as a source of marine pollution in the
regional treaties dealing with these areas.285 While the need to take account of
air pollution when dealing with the oceans has not been institutionalized as a
global obligation, one detects at least thefons et origio of such an obligation in
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).2 6 UNCLOS
obliges states to protect and preserve the marine environment by dealing with
all sources of pollution. Referring specifically to toxics, it requires states to
minimize toxic pollution from land-based, atmospheric pollution and dumping.
This putative integrative obligation is reinforced by the stipulation that states
shall not transfer damage or hazards from one area to another or transform one
type of pollution into another.W
United States policies on the need for more scientific research in these
and other areas flow into a larger stream of international policies moving in the
same direction. The UNEP/ICSU/WM028 and a score of Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs)289 are undertaking the same task. It becomes clear that
the United States and the international community are addressing the same
problem, and that the United States could well integrate its policies with those
of the international community. The reduction of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases is supported by arguments resonating in United States as well
as in international law. They concern the obligations to protect future
generations; the duties toward nature; and the need to preserve the global
commons. It is to these proposals that we now turn.
2. The Duty to Posterity
We inhabit two worlds. One is the natural world of plants and animals,
of soil, air and water which fashioned us as it evolved through the years. The
other is the world of social institutions and artifacts we build for ourselves
using tools, engines, science and technology. The technological world we
inhabit has created an astonishingly good quality of life and offers us an
unprecedented standard of living. But there is a cost to pay. The comforts of
283. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 27, at 192 (the Report expresses serious
doubts about the advantages of HEP).
284. Teclaff & Teclaff, International Control of Cross-Media Pollution-An
Ecosystems Approach, 27 NAT. RES. J. 21 (1987).
285. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources,
Paris, Feb. 21, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT. L. MATS. 352 (1974). This convention impliedly,
though not explicitly, recognizes air pollution as a source of marine pollution. Article 3(c) has
been so interpreted by the Paris Commission which was set up by the Convention. Article
6(2)(d) of this convention refers to the need for an "integrated planning policy."
The Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area,
Helsinki, March 22, 1974, 13 INT. L. MATs. 544 (1974), expressly recognized the importance
of airborne and indirect pollution of the Baltic Sea area. See Art. 2(2).
286. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 194(3) & Art. 195,
reproduced in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OFTHE SEA (K.R. Simmonds ed. 1986).
287. See Guruswamy, Environmental Protection and the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, 4, LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 705 (1983).
288. See supra note 17.
289. Such as Greenpeace International, Friends of the Earth, World Wide Fund for
Nature. A cogent case for adopting a new approach to international environmental problems that
is not confined to states but includes NGOs is made by Sands, The Environment, Community
andInternational Law, 30 HARV. INT'L Li. 393 (1989).
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modem living that we take for granted arise out of a staggering range of
domestic and industrial activities. These activities make high demands on
energy and raw materials, and give rise to enormous quantities of wastes,
residuals and pollutants. There is an almost unending list of energy use and
pollution. Energy is consumed by us for heating and cooling; for moving us
rapidly by air, land, and water; chemicals (pesticides, fungicides, and
insecticides) are used for producing clean, long lasting food. Add to this the
luxurious materials with which we build our houses, furnish our homes, cars,
boats and attire ourselves. And so it continues.
The matter and energy used in these activities are neither created nor
destroyed but merely transformed. Massive quantities of wastes or residuals
are, therefore, the unavoidable by-products of today's living.290 These
residuals or wastes have an impact on the natural world we also inhabit. We
create problems for posterity because the disposal of our wastes will affect the
uses that future generations can make of the natural environment and the costs
that they must bear in doing so. In the case of carbon dioxide and other trace
gases, the full devastating effects of the climatic changes we cause may occur
several generations in the future.
The difficulty of the dilemma cannot be understated. The material world
we have created in the twentieth century is very agreeable. It is a fairly general
characteristic of human nature to avoid backbreaking and monotonous work, to
seek comfort, to be fascinated by personal possessions, and to enjoy having a
good time.291 For the first time in human history working men and women,
not merely the one percent of rich elites, are able to enjoy this handsome
standard of living. By any historical assessment, the twentieth century has seen
every index of good living such as energy use, the consumption of foodstuffs
and raw materials, health standards, housing and transport, taking off for the
stratosphere. At the core of the new situation is the interaction of increasing
numbers of people, all seeking to make use of more energy and more
materials. 292
The reason why the modem age has seen, in so many countries, the
extension of wealth from a traditional elite to the masses is in part political. It
290. A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND RESIDUALS
MANAGEMENT (1979); B. RABE, FRAGMENTATION AND INTEGRATION IN STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 15 n.46 (1986); Kneese, Pollution and a Better Environment,
10 ARIZ. L. REV. 10, 11 (1968); A. KNEESE, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 16-73
(1977); M. HUFSCHMIDT, D. JAMES, A. MESrrER, B. BOWER & J. DIXON, ENVIRONMENT,
NATURAL SYSTEMS AND DEVELOPMENT 73-113 (1983); L. ORTOLANDO, ENVIRONMENTAL
PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING 25-34 (1984); J. LOWE, D. LEWIS & M. ATKINS, TOTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 3 (1982).
291. The proof of this basic psychological bias can be seen in the behavior of any
wealthy group ever since neolithic man began, through settled agriculture, to build up a surplus
of goods above the level of tribal subsistence. See B. WARD & R. DUBOSS, ONLY ONE EARTH
9-10 (1972).
292. Nearly 50 years ago Buckminster Fuller made an estimate of the muscular energy
needed to produce the then available supplies of power and suggested that each American had the
equivalent of 153 slaves. Today the figure would probably be nearer 500. Machines and
gadgets do what slaves traditionally did - lighten domestic work, cook food, carry people, rush
with fans and heaters, deliver clothes, finery and ornaments which they have produced in the
first place, play continuous music and remove garbage. Energy powered machines also do what
slaves could not. Only genies and magic carpets could fly us through the air. Id. at 10.
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stems from the emergence of democracy, equality and social justice. But the
conclusions of Ward and Dubos are incontrovertible:
wider prosperity is due much more to the extensions of
technology; above all, to the enormous increase in supplies of
energy. Energy is at the root of the productivity, of the ability to
make 'more for less' that offers most citizens in a modernized
society an inconceivably enlarged range of material choice.293
The problem, of course, is that the burning of fossil fuels, which
produces the energy we depend upon, results in increasing releases of carbon
dioxide that might irreversibly alter the natural world of the biosphere on
which future human survival depends. But in cutting down on fossil fuels, it is
feared that we may seriously affect the development, prosperity, and material
needs of the whole world, more poignantly of developing countries.
The Australian poet Mary Gilmore starkly summarized the distribution
dilemma facing the decision makers who have to make decisions about natural
resources today, that have ramifications in the future:
All men at God's round table sit,
And all men must be fed.
But this loaf in my hand,
This loaf is my son's bread.294
Both religious and ethical norms suggest that all nations, rich and poor,
have a duty to posterity. Diverse religious traditions have recognized the
concept of trusteeship or stewardship for the natural environment. In the
Judeo-Christian tradition, God gave the earth to his people to be cared for,
husbanded and passed on to succeeding generations. Islamic law obliges man to
account to God for the use of natural resources and nature. Each generation is
entitled to use the resources but must care for them and pass them to future
generations. 295 The same principle is found in non-theistic traditions of Asia
and South Asia, as well as in Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism.296 But what of
non-theistic and non-religious ethical norms? And can obligations to future
generations be grounded in principles of biological behavior independent even
of ethics?
The difficulty of the choice between present and future generations is
particularly poignant in the case of poor countries. How can we expect an
impoverished country to care about future generations if it cannot even care for
its own people today? It is not proposed to enter a discussion of an answer
except to point out that it will not be possible without the assistance of the
wealthier countries of the world. 297
Self-interest and altruism toward those who share our genes is part of
our genetically coded human heritage,298 that belongs to the "hard core" of our
293. Id.
294. Cited by Ashby, supra note 151, at 5.
295. E. BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS To FUTURE GENERATIONS; INTERNATIONAL
LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 18-19 (1989).
296. Id. at 20-21.
297. E. BROWN WEISS, supra note 295, at 27.
298. Ashby, supra note 151, at 9.
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inheritance. 299 The obligation toward posterity is usually limited to a basic
genetically coded feature of human nature, which we share with many of the
animals: an instinct to leave the environment in a fit state for our children and
our grandchildren. This genetically coded feeling of altruism has now been
extended by ethical theory beyond the pale of kinship. We refer here to
differing strands in environmental philosophy and ethical theory which argues
for a duty to avoid endangering future persons regardless of kinship.30°
What does emerge from this development is the recognition that the duty
to posterity and the duty to nature are but two halves of an ethical whole.3o It
is then to the incompleted half of the obligation to posterity, found in the duty
to nature, that we now turn.
3. The Duty to Nature
The idea that the treatment of nature should be seen as a moral issue
conditioned or restrained by ethics is one of the most extraordinary
developments in recent intellectual history,30 2 representing "the farthest
extension of ethical theory in the history of the universe."' 03 It is a movement
of ideas that has changed the basis of human responsibility to nature, and led to
the "greening" of ethical theory.304 This environmental philosophy is reflected
in legislation protecting animals and nature. We have noted that a large body
of legislation preserves nature and protects plants, species and nature from
extinction305 Such legislation includes the Clean Water Act, NEPA, and the
Endangered Species Act.
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESP)306 is worthy of special
mention. The purposes of ESP are inter alia to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may
299. Id. at 22.
300. The subject of environmental ethics, in general, includes the following: K.
SHRADER-FRECHETrE. ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1981), D. SCHRER & T. ATrIG, ETHICS
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1983), R. ATrFIEL, THE ETHICS OF ENViRONMENTAL CONCERN
(1983). With regard to the extension of rights to future generations see J. PASSMORE, MAN'S
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE: ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND WESTERN TRADITIONS, 73-100
(1974). Passmore quotes Kant's statement that "human nature is such that it cannot be
indifferent even to the most remote epoch which may eventually affect our species, so long as
this epoch may be expected with certainty." Id. at 78. See also Baler, For the Sake of Future
Generations, in EARTHBOUND 214-41 (1984); Barry, Justice between Generations, in LAW,
MORALITY AND SOCIETY (P. Hacker & J. Rax eds. 1977); R. Manning, Environmental Ethics
and John Rawls' Theory of Justice, 3 ENVTL. ETHICS 155-61 (1981).
Others have argued for a kind of moral evolution. See, e.g., L. KOHLBERG, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981). Kohlberg reasoned that moral motivation
passes through stages of growth. Beginning with pure self interest at infancy there is a
progression in moral responsibility that initially includes mother, father and immediate family
and is later extended to town, nation and species. His thinking has been adapted by socio-
biologists. See G. KIEFFER, BIOETHICS: A TEXTBOOK OF ISSUES 36 (1974).
301. As Nash points out, ethical duties have progressed from duties toward people to
duties toward nature. See R. NASH, supra note 151, at 4-5. Tribe illustrated such a
development when he wrote about a "spirit of moral evolution" that has recently spread to
include blacks and women and was beginning to incorporate animals, plants, and might, in the
distant future, include canyons, mountains or a seashore. Tribe, supra note 141, at 1341-45.
302. R. NASH, supra note 151, at 4-5.
303. Id. at 122.
304. For an excellent survey see id., esp. ch. 5, The Greening of Philosophy, 121-61.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 144-50.
306. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (West Supp. 1987).
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be conserved, and to provide a program for the conservation of such
endangered species. 30 7 The facts of TVA v. Hill308 in which section 7 of the
Act was interpreted are instructive. In that case construction of a $119 million
hydroelectric power project was underway when the snail darter - a three
inch member of the perch family - was discovered. The Sixth Circuit blocked
the completion of the project because it would destroy the only known habitat
of the snail darter. The Supreme Court affirmed holding that section 7 which
required all federal agencies to "insure actions authorized, funded, or carried
out by [such agency] do not jeopardize the continued existence of such
endangered species and threatened species.. ." admitted of no exception for the
dam.309 By so deciding the Supreme Court confirmed the validity of the Act's
nature-based rationale. The corollary of such a rationale is that whenever
nature, buildings, or our cultural heritage are protected by legislation, they are
also being preserved for future generations.
Joseph Sax and other commentators argue310 that certain common
properties such as rivers, the seashore, and the air are held in trust by the
government for the benefit of the public, and that the public possesses
inviolable rights in them. Judicial law making has now incorporated the
concept into United States law. The doctrine of the public trust was historically
concerned with public rights in navigable rivers, such as commerce, navigation
and fishing, but has now been extended to environmental, recreational and
ecological values in navigable waters. 311 It has even embraced rural
parklands, 312 a historic battlefield,313 wildlife314 and archaeological remains. 315
One state supreme court went so far as to construe the trust to apply to all
natural resources including air and water.316 Judicial law-making however,
has stopped short of extending the public trust doctrine to public lands.317
The concepts found in national law are reflected, albeit opaquely on
occasion, by international law. The use of national law analogies within other
307. Id. § 2(b).
308. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
309. Id. at 160 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1976)).
310. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, esp. 158-74 (1970); MOUNTAINS
WITHOUT HANDRAILS 111-13 (1980); Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its
Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185 (1980). For an illuminating and sophisticated
review of the doctrine and its application, together with the author's own views about the
limitations of the doctrine, see Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986).
311. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 435, 658 P.2d 709,
719, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 356, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65
Haw. 641, 673-77, 658 P.2d 287, 310-12 (1982); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota
State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 462-64 (N.D. 1976).
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Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 421, 215 N.E.2d 114, 121 (1966).
313. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 197-
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areas of international law has been demonstrated, 318 and international
environmental law is no exception. That law presently protects certain habitats
and species,3 19 and commentators have sought to extend the concept of the
public trust to international law. One such commentator has asserted that each
generation receives a natural and cultural legacy in trust from previous
generations and holds it in trust for future generations. 320 Support for such an
argument, together with a recognition of the danger to future generations, is
implicit in the international agreement providing for phased reductions of
chlorofluorocarbons and halons.321
4. The Global Commons
Global warming constitutes a community problem because the
atmosphere or airspace over which nations claim complete and exclusive
sovereignty critically affects our climate. The atmosphere or airspace, no less
than outer space, is now demonstrably "the province of all mankind."322
Unfortunately, international law recognizes the complete and exclusive
sovereignty of states to the airspace above them. There have been other
theories about the status of airspace, but the view that a state has complete and
exclusive sovereignty above its territory seems to have been generally
accepted.323
There are countervailing norms in the form of principles of state
responsibility. The most notable of these norms, restated in Principle 21 and
318. E. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1927).
319. See, e.g., Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitat (1971), reprinted in 11 INT'L L. MATS. 969 (1972); Convention on
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (1979), reprinted in 19 INT'L L. MATS. 15
(1980); Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
(1972), 27 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226. The Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973), reprinted in 12 INT'L L. MATS. 1085
(1973).
320. E. BROWN WEISS, supra note 295. Edith Brown Weiss argues that all people and
countries have an obligation to conserve the biological legacy we have inherited for present and
future generations. Id. at 194. See also REsPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (E.
Partridge ed. 1981); O'Toole & Walton, Intergenerational Equity as it Relates to Conservation
and Coal Extraction Standards, 22 NAT'L RESOURCES J. 53 (1982); Weiss, The Planetary
Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495 (1984).
321. See supra text accompanying notes 235-244. The Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer "is the first global convention to address an issue that for the time
being seems far in the future and is of unknown proportions. . . . Those who could be
threatened are the future generations that will have to live in a world that, through errors in
judgment or mere short-sightedness, we risk making uninhabitable .... ." Excerpted from a
statement by Dr. Mostafa K. Tolba, Executive Director of UNEP, at the Convention, reproduced
in 27 ENV'T 20 (1985).
322. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 28, 1967, art. 1, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 206, reprinted in 6 INT'L L. MATS 386
(1967).
323. See MCNAIR, THE LAW OF THE AIR 6 (M. Kerr & A. Evans 3d ed. 1964); J.
SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 261-82 (3d ed.
1988); Statement of the Meetings of Legal and Policy Experts, art. 3 (Feb. 20-22, 1989); N.
MATrE, TREATY ON AIR-AERONAUTICAL LAW 132, 605 (1981); SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT,
AIR LAW (P. Martin, D. McClean, E. Martin & R. Margo eds., 4th ed. 1986). This right is, of
course, subject to modification and has been modified by a variety of treaty arrangements dealing
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22 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, burden states
with a responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. 24 Despite the existence of such a general norm
the application of the law is still shrouded in uncertainty.
Objection can be raised about attributing to states the conduct of private
entities not acting on behalf of the state.325 The better view, is that a state is
responsible for the activities of private or public corporations so long as they
are under the state's jurisdiction or control.326 A more substantial theoretical
difficulty lies in reconciling the norm controlling environmental harm with
another granting to states "the sovereign rights to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies." 327 Third, there may also be
difficulties of proving causation to the extent that global warming is caused by
the combined effect of emissions from many nations.32S Fourth, principles of
liability that operate ex post can only be invoked after damage has been
inflicted. As we have seen, this may be too late in the case of global warming
as the damage could well be irreparable.
Finally, Chernoby 329 demonstrated the lamentable extent to which states
refrain from pursuing remedies in international law even where there is serious
damage accompanied by an implied acceptance of negligence on the part of the
USSR.330 In the result, the extent to which the principles of state responsibility
lend themselves to preventing global warminig seems dubious. Moreover, the
will of nations to exercise guardianship over the global commons, even
assuming the existence of customary law, seems minimal.
What is required is a norm modifying the principle of state sovereignty.
The concept of the global commons provides for the development of such a
norm. The beginnings or fons et origio of the global commons can be detected
in the regimes dealing with Antarctica, Outerspace and the Law of the Sea.
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 31 Including the Moon and Other Celestial
largely with air traffic. See. e.g., International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago
Convention), Dec. 7. 1944, 84 U.N.T.S. 390.
324. Report of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF
48/14/Rev. 1, reprinted in 11 INT'L L. MATS 1416, 1420 (1972).
325. The International Law Commission's general principles of State Responsibility in
1980 provided that "the conduct of a person or a group of persons not acting on behalf of the
State shall not be considered an act of the State under international law." Art. 11, Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, Part 2, at 30.
326. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 601 (1986).
327. The Stockholm Conference, supra note 324.
328. Nanda, Global Warming and International Environmental Law -A Preliminary
Inquiry, 30 HARV. INT'L L. 375, 382 (1989).
329. P. SANDS, CHERNOBYL: LAW AND COMMUNICATIONS; TRANSBOUNDARY
NUCLEAR AIR POLLUTION - THE LEGAL MATERIALS (1988).
330. Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30 HARV. INT'L
LJ. 393 (1989). While pointing out that states have exercised their right to prefer claims arising
from transboundary pollution only once in the last 50 years (id. at 406), the author argues that
there is no clear and precise rule of customary international law placing an obligation on states to
prevent transboundary nuclear pollution (id. at 404-05).
331. The limits of airspace or the atmosphere have not been precisely defined, though
there is growing consensus that outerspace begins and sovereign airspace must consequently end
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Bodies, Jan. 28, 1967, views outer space as a global commons. It provides in
Art. 1 and 11 that:
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies shall be
free for exploration and use by all the States without
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance
with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of
celestial bodies.
Outer space including the moon and other celestial bodies, is
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by
means of use or occupation, or by any other means....
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959332 freezes existing territorial claims to that
region333 but does not declare it a global commons. Because the treaty asserts
that no claims to sovereignty can be made while the treaty is in operation, it is
possible to argue that this constitutes a significant step in the move toward
commons status. 334 The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resources Activities, 1989 (CRAMRA) is a further step in Antarctica's
evolution toward a global commons. It'authorizes mineral resource activities
only after demonstrating that no significant adverse effects on the environment
will result, and imposes strict liability for environmental damage. 335
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea336 established an
Area (defined as the sea-bed and the ocean floor and subsoil beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction337) and its resources as the common heritage of
mankind.338 No state is allowed to claim or exercise sovereignty over this
Area, and all its resources are vested in mankind as a whole.339 All activities in
the Area shall be carried out on behalf of mankind as a whole by the
International Sea-Bed Authority.340
A recent resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on the
"Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of
Mankind 341 points toward recognizing the atmosphere as a global commons.
Although the resolution makes no mention of the "common heritage" the text
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Colloquium of the Law of Outer Space 71, 73 (1984), cited by J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N.
LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 312 (3rd ed. 1988).
332. Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 72.
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future.
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ALTERNATIVES 389, 406 (1989).
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336. U.N. Doec. A/CONF 62/122, 7 Oct. 1982 and A/CONF 62/122/ Corr. 3, 23 Nov.
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refers to "the vital interests of all mankind" affected by climate change and of
the need to confront the problem within a global framework.342
In order to be effective, fresh legal policies and concerted legal responses
are required from the United States as well as the Soviet Union and Western
Europe 343 to control the use of the atmosphere 3" and prevent it from being
treated as a depository or air dump for pollutants. To the extent that
international law gives states complete sovereignty over the airspace superjacent
to their territory, it is necessary to change the law by means of an international
treaty or convention. Such a treaty is a virtual certainty, and it is vital that the
United States should provide leadership in treating the atmosphere as a global
commons.
V. CONCLUSION
Once it is agreed that action needs to be taken about global warming, the
argument that the United States should develop laws and policies that integrate
United States and international concerns is difficult to resist. The four themes
canvassed above provide the political and jurisprudential rationales for
integrating international norms into United States law. The purpose of such
integration must be re-emphasized. It is to enable both United States and
International law to arrive at a practical answer to the urgent and fundamental
question that arises for consideration in any discussion on global warming.
That question is: should we make substantial reductions in the emission of
carbon dioxide today? The extent of the reduction suggested in the Bills before
Congress is a reduction of twenty percent by the year 2000. It is the burden of
this article that such a reduction should be undertaken.
In the light of the fact that cheap energy constitutes the foundations of
our present material prosperity, the implications of such a step are simply
enormous. They touch the deepest roots' of the economy and will affect the
prosperity and quality of life not only of this country but of the entire
community of nations. A decision to substantially cut carbon dioxide emissions
can only make sense within the framework of an international agreement. The
making of such an agreement falls within the province of international law.
The convergence of United States and international concerns present a
promising baseline from which to approach a problem that will surely rank
among the greatest in the nineties and the century 2000. The challenge has to
be met. This article identifies and offers a theoretical framework and policies
that might constitute a starting point from which to attempt the long and
arduous task of confronting this truly planetary problem.
342. Id.
343. In 1985, out of a total of 20.5 billion tons of CO, emitted, 23% originated in the
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344. Supra note 331.
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